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With a new climate change agreement from the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) conference held in Paris last 
December, attention has shifted to the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs)—the post-2020 
climate actions that countries intend to take under 
the new agreement. When the Paris agreement is 
ratified, the NDCs will become the first greenhouse 
gas targets under the UNFCCC that applied to both 
developed and developing countries.
A large number of countries recognize the role of 
forests in carbon sequestration and committed in 
their NDCs to protect forests, reduce deforestation 
rates, and restore forestlands. Few NDCs, however, 
make any specific commitments to how their forests 
will be protected or restored on degraded land. It 
is still unclear if governments will protect forests 
by expanding the protected estate, improving the 
management of existing national parks, helping 
communities safeguard the forests on their lands, 
or by taking other measures. 
The research for this report was designed to help 
governments make these decisions. It examines the 
environmental and economic arguments for one 
specific approach to protecting forests—securing 
indigenous forestlands.
The research included original matching analysis 
to determine the effect of secure tenure on 
deforestation rates in indigenous lands in the 
Amazon forest in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. 
Indigenous land covers at least 149 million hectares 
or almost 24 percent of the Amazon forest in these 
three countries. The analysis finds that the annual 
deforestation rates in the tenure-secure indigenous 
forestlands are significantly lower than on other 
similar lands in all three countries, suggesting 
that securing tenure contributes to reducing 
deforestation in these areas. 
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The research also involved conducting benefit-
cost analysis to examine the economics of secur-
ing indigenous land rights in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia. While focusing on carbon sequestra-
tion benefits, the analysis valued six other critical 
ecosystem services—hydrological services; nutrient 
retention; regulation of local climate dynamics and 
water cycling; pollination; existence value; and 
recreation and tourism. The analysis shows that 
securing indigenous forestland tenure is a low-cost, 
high-benefit investment. Secure indigenous forest-
lands provide significant global carbon and other 
ecosystem service benefits in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia, estimated at between $679 and $1,530 
billion for the next 20 years. Meanwhile, the costs 
of securing indigenous forestlands amount to less 
than 1 percent of these benefits.
Equally important, from a financial perspective, 
investing in securing indigenous forestland tenure is 
a relatively cost-effective measure for climate change 
mitigation when compared with other measures. 
The research shows that the costs of securing 
indigenous lands are 5 to 42 times lower than the 
average costs of avoided CO2 through fossil carbon 
capture and storage for both coal- and gas-fired 
power plants. 
Given these results, investing in securing indig-
enous forestlands tenure would be a relatively 
inexpensive action that governments of forested 
countries could take to help meet the CO2 emissions 
reduction objectives put forward in their NDCs. 
We hope that governments and their partners—
communities, civil society organizations, donor 
agencies, and others—find this report useful as they 
implement their NDCs and put their countries on a 
path toward a low-carbon, climate-resilient future.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Community lands can generate significant social, economic, and 
environmental benefits for communities and society. They are a 
primary source of livelihood, nutrition, income, and employment 
for Indigenous Peoples and other communities in Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and elsewhere. Community forestlands provide a suite 
of ecosystem-service benefits, including carbon sequestration, 
pollination, and nutrient retention. 
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A large body of literature shows that community 
forestlands with secure tenure are often linked to 
low deforestation rates, significant forest cover, 
and the sustainable production of timber and other 
forest products. Titling or other measures to secure 
land rights do not alone guarantee low deforesta-
tion rates, but tenure security is recognized as an 
important precursor to other factors that promote 
sustainable management of community forestlands.
Much is known about the local and societal ben-
efits of many community forestlands; questions 
remain, however, about the economics of secur-
ing community forestland tenure. This research 
report seeks to address this issue by asking: What 
are the costs compared to the benefits of securing 
and maintaining tenure for indigenous forestlands 
in the Amazon basin? Building on WRI’s recently 
published working paper, The Economic Costs and 
Benefits of Securing Community Forest Tenure: 
Evidence from Brazil and Guatemala, this report 
focuses on indigenous forestlands in the Amazon 
basin of Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia; provides 
original matching analysis on deforestation rates; 
incorporates an array of ecosystem services into the 
benefit-cost analysis; and provides a set of policy 
and program recommendations. 
This report aims to inform technical leads in the 
land, forest, and financial sectors of governments, 
as well as funding agencies, on the economic gains 
achievable from securing community forestlands. 
Such information can encourage new investments 
in recognizing and protecting community land 
rights. It may also help Indigenous Peoples, com-
munities, and their partners to make economic 
arguments for securing their land rights.
The matching analysis shows: 
Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
exhibit low deforestation rates. The annual 
deforestation rates in the tenure-secure indigenous 
forestlands are significantly lower than on other 
lands in the three research countries of Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Colombia, suggesting that securing 
indigenous forestland tenure contributed to 
reducing deforestation in these areas between  
2000 and 2012. 
 ▪ In Bolivia, the 12-year average observed 
actual deforestation rate inside tenure-secure 
indigenous forestlands was 0.15 percent, while 
the 12-year average estimated deforestation 
rate outside indigenous forestlands was  
0.43 percent.
 ▪ In Brazil, the deforestation rate inside tenure-
secure indigenous forestlands was 0.06 percent, 
while the deforestation rate outside indigenous 
forestlands was 0.15 percent.
 ▪ In Colombia, the deforestation rate inside 
tenure secure indigenous forestlands was 0.04 
percent, while the deforestation rate outside 
indigenous forestlands was 0.08 percent.
The benefit-cost analysis yields two principal 
findings:
1. Securing indigenous forestland tenure is 
a low-cost, high-benefit investment.
 □ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
provide significant global carbon benefits 
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, amount-
ing to a total of US$25–34 billion over the 
next 20 years in net present value through 
the avoided annual release of an esti-
mated 42.8–59.7 Mt CO2 emissions. This 
is equivalent to taking between 9 and 12.6 
million passenger vehicles off the roads for 
one year. 
 □ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands pro-
vide significant local and regional ecosys-
tem-service benefits, including regulation 
of local climate dynamics and water cycling, 
hydrological services, pollination, nutrient 
retention, existence values, and recreation 
and tourism values. These benefits are 
estimated to range between $679 and 1,530 
billion (or $4,559–10,274/ha) for the next 
20 years, calculated in net present value re-
sulting from indigenous forestland tenure-
security investment. 
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 ▪ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands provide 
low-cost forest conservation investments for 
governments. Investments in tenure security 
are estimated at $45 per hectare (ha) in Bolivia, 
$68/ha in Brazil, and $6/ha in Colombia—the 
calculated sum of discounted total costs for a 
20-year period. This amounts to at most 1 per-
cent of the total benefits derived from tenure-
secure indigenous forestlands in the three 
countries. Comparing the total benefits with the 
costs, securing indigenous forestland tenure 
can generate a positive net per-hectare benefit 
for all three countries.
2. Securing indigenous forestlands tenure 
has significant potential for cost-effective 
carbon mitigation. From a financial perspec-
tive, investing in securing indigenous forestland 
tenure is a relatively cost-effective measure 
for climate change mitigation when compared 
with other carbon capture and storage mea-
sures. The estimated costs of carbon mitigation 
through indigenous forestland tenure-security 
programs in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
range from $2.04–3.66/tCO2, $8.74–11.88/
tCO2, and $4.75–7.26/tCO2, respectively. These 
costs are significantly lower than the average 
costs of avoided CO2 through fossil carbon 
capture and storage, which are estimated to 
be about $58/tCO2 for coal-fired power plants 
(5 to 29 times more expensive than securing 
indigenous forestland tenure) and $85/tCO2 for 
natural gas-fired power plants (7 to 42 times 
more expensive). 
These findings present a strong economic case for 
governments, climate change funding agencies, 
civil society organizations, and other parties to 
invest in securing indigenous forestland tenure 
in Latin America. While significant progress has 
been made in some Amazon basin countries over 
the last 10–30 years toward formally recognizing 
community lands, more efforts are needed to secure 
the community lands that are not documented or 
protected by government. These efforts include the 
need for the following:
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1. Secure community land rights. Govern-
ments and their partners should consider 
reforming their laws and taking other actions 
to strengthen community land rights. For 
instance, the laws in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colom-
bia recognize indigenous land rights, but do 
not provide Indigenous Peoples with sufficient 
legal protections. Statutory laws that do not 
adequately protect community land rights 
should be reformed or replaced by support-
ive legislation. For Indigenous Peoples and 
communities to realize their rights, laws that 
support their lands must also be implemented 
and enforced. Despite some progress in secur-
ing land rights in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, 
considerable areas of indigenous lands are not 
mapped, demarcated, or formally registered. 
Governments should remove administrative 
hurdles and provide responsible agencies with 
the human and financial resources needed to 
document and protect all indigenous and com-
munity lands in their country. 
2. Make tenure-secure community forest-
lands a central climate change mitigation 
strategy. The Nationally Determined Contri-
butions (NDCs) of Bolivia, Brazil, and Colom-
bia do not make any specific commitments 
to securing indigenous land rights, but the 
research findings show that indigenous lands 
have helped reduce deforestation rates. Had the 
Indigenous Peoples not had secure tenure over 
their lands and forests, the CO2 emissions of 
each country would have been higher—about 9 
percent more per year in Bolivia, and 3 percent 
more per year in Brazil and Colombia. For 
Brazil, this emission difference is equivalent 
to 25–35 percent of Belgium’s national CO2 
equivalent (CO2e) emissions in 2012. Given 
these carbon benefits, investing in secur-
ing indigenous forestland tenure would be a 
relatively inexpensive action that governments 
could take to help meet the emissions reduction 
objectives put forward in their NDCs. 
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3. Utilize international development funds 
to support securing community forestland 
tenure. The research findings provide evidence 
that governments and their partners should 
increasingly direct their resources to securing 
indigenous and community forestland tenure. 
The funds could support government agencies to 
formally document community lands as well as 
the Indigenous Peoples and communities which 
invest in protecting their forests. In addition to 
traditional bilateral and multilateral support, 
governments should look to the global climate 
finance architecture, such as the Global Environ-
ment Facility, Green Climate Fund, and Africa 
Climate Change Fund. Some analysts have argued 
that progress in reducing deforestation through 
these and other climate funds has been limited. 
This research suggests that climate funds could 
in some cases meet their climate change and 
avoided deforestation objectives by supporting 
efforts to secure community land rights.
Given that many community lands around the 
world are not secured, these recommendations may 
also apply to other countries. The recently launched 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and new 
Paris agreement to curb climate change present 
opportunities for the world to secure indigenous 
and other community lands and achieve positive 
development and environment outcomes.
Finally, further analysis is needed on the benefits 
and costs of securing indigenous and community 
forestland tenure. For example, additional research 
is critical to:
 ▪ Address data constraints that limit 
more comprehensive analysis. Improved 
methods for valuing ecosystem services and 
social benefits, coupled with disaggregated and 
transparent budgetary data, would help to fill 
some of the data gaps.
 ▪ Conduct benefit-cost analysis of other 
community lands. It is important to assess 
the economic benefits and costs for non-
indigenous community lands in the Amazon 
basin (e.g., Quilimbola communities in Brazil) 
as well as community forestlands in other parts 
of the world, especially Africa. 
 ▪ Conduct complementary economic 
analysis on tenure-secure community 
lands. The benefit-cost analysis in this report 
identified several questions that need further 
study. For example, additional research is 
needed on the opportunity costs of different 
uses of indigenous lands.
WRI.org        8
DEFINITION OF COMMONLY USED TERMS
 ▪ Benefit-Cost Analysis is an economic decision-making approach. In this report, benefit-cost analysis is used to assess 
whether the continual effort of securing indigenous forestland tenure in the Amazon basin is worth pursuing from an economic 
perspective, that is, benefits outweigh costs. It involves comparing the total expected costs of establishing and maintaining forest-
tenure security against the total expected benefits.
 ▪ Communities are groupings of individuals and families that share common interests in a definable local land area within which 
they normally reside. Communities vary in size, identity, internal equity, and land-use systems, and may distribute rights to land in 
different ways. However, with regard to community lands, communities everywhere are similar in several ways: 
 □ They have strong connections to particular areas or territories and consider these domains to be customarily under their 
ownership and/or control. 
 □ They determine and apply the rules and mechanisms through which rights to land are distributed and governed. The rules them-
selves alter over time, as do the mechanisms through which they are upheld (e.g., from autocratic chiefs to committees). Many 
rules are customary, based on tried and tested customs followed by forebears. Others are new, developed by the community to 
address new challenges (e.g., land shortage) or to be consistent with constitutional rights of members who are also citizens of 
modern states (e.g., women’s land rights). 
 □ Collective tenure and decision-making characterize the system. Usually, all or part of the community land is owned in 
common by members of the community, to whom rights are distributed. Sometimes, community lands are traditionally entirely 
subdivided into family lands over which the community retains authority, establishing the means by which family rights are 
recognized, held, used, and transferred.
 ▪ Community Forestlands are community lands with standing forests. In some countries, the law recognizes that community 
property includes the rights to all trees on the lands. In other places, the law provides that certain trees or forests (often naturally 
occurring trees or forests) are the property of the state.
 ▪ Community Lands are all lands that fall under the customary governance of the community, whether or not this is recognized in 
national law. Community land is variously described as the community domain, communal land, community land area, community 
territory, or other terms. Some communities hold and use all of their land communally, such as hunter-gatherers. Many communi-
ties, however, do not use all of their land communally. While the community exercises jurisdiction over the entire land area, it may 
be the case that each family possesses its own distinct part of the domain. Or the community may draw a distinction between lands 
that it has allocated to families for residence and permanent farming, and other lands that remain the shared property of all mem-
bers, which are referred to as commons, commonage, or common property. Lands for grazing and wildlife, forests and woodlands, 
mountaintops, sacred localities, and lakes and streams within the community land are usually retained deliberately as collective 
property commons to which all members have use rights.
 ▪ Customary Tenure means community-based systems of land ownership and administration that have longstanding origins in the 
norms and practices (customary law) of communities and may go back centuries. Under customary tenure, it is the community that 
decides the type of rights allocated within its area and upholds these rights through community-based mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms may be traditional, such as vesting land authority in a chief or a council of elders, or they may be more modern, such as an 
elected land committee, a village council, a community assembly of members, or procedures adopted into the norms and rules of 
an official community-level local government. The same customary tenure rules are usually followed by all communities within the 
same ethnic group or tribe. Practices are also often similar across regions and continents where the same land-use systems are fol-
lowed. Although the term customary is not uniformly in use, it is important to note because many countries make reference in their 
constitutions to customary tenure and customary law. 
 ▪ Ecosystem Services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. For example, forest-ecosystem services include the provi-
sion of fuelwood, timber, plants and other forest products; the regulation of climate and water cycles; carbon sequestration; erosion 
control; pollination; and important species habitats.
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DEFINITION OF COMMONLY USED TERMS
 ▪ Indigenous Forestlands are indigenous lands with standing forests. 
 ▪ Indigenous Lands or territories refer to the collectively held and governed lands (and natural resources) of Indigenous Peoples. 
As with other community lands, some indigenous lands may, with group consent, be allocated for use by individuals and families. 
Other indigenous land is managed as common property. In a few cases, indigenous land is held by individuals or families (e.g., 
New Zealand). 
 ▪ Indigenous Peoples are, by precept of international soft law, those sectors of the world’s communities that identify themselves 
as such. They adopt this definition on various grounds, such as having stronger relations to their land than other nationals, longer 
origins in the locality, or distinctive cultures and ways of life that run special risks of being denied or lost in modern conditions. 
Many communities consider themselves indigenous to the locality but do not define themselves as Indigenous Peoples. This is 
especially so in Africa and Asia. Moreover, there are many commonalities in land tenure and governance between Indigenous 
Peoples and other communities. The distinction between Indigenous Peoples and other communities is often made mainly because 
their rights may be subject to special national legislation, which must be reviewed distinctly from laws affecting the rights of other 
communities. In addition, Indigenous Peoples are the subject of specific internationally recognized collective rights, including rights 
to land and natural resources (e.g., International Labour Organization Convention 169, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples). 
 ▪ Land Rights are the rights of individuals or groups of peoples, including communities and Indigenous Peoples, over land. The 
bundle of rights can include the rights of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. The bundle can also include 
rights to various natural resources on and below the surface of the land (e.g., trees, wildlife, water, minerals). The source of these 
rights can be statutory law or customary law.
 ▪ Land Tenure is the statutory or customarily defined relationship among people—as individuals or groups—with respect to land. 
It includes the full range of social relationships between people and communities with regard to accessing, possessing, controlling, 
and transferring land and natural resources. Land-tenure systems determine who can use what resources for how long and under 
what circumstances (FAO 2002).
 ▪ Matching Analysis refers to a statistical impact-evaluation technique widely used in economic evaluations of policy impact. 
Matching analysis allows for the isolation of a specific policy-change impact (e.g., establishment of tenure security) and seeks to 
explicitly force “apples to apples” comparisons by pairing protected and unprotected locations that are similar in their landscape 
characteristics.
 ▪ Non-Use Values are values that are not related to the current or future uses of an ecosystem service, but are derived from the 
knowledge that an ecosystem exists and is maintained. 
 ▪ Opportunity Costs refer to the foregone income from alternative land use that Indigenous Peoples and other parties would have 
received if the indigenous forestlands were converted to another highest-value alternative land use, such as agriculture or cattle 
pastures. 
 ▪ Tenure Security is the certainty that a person’s rights to land will be recognized by others and protected in cases of specific chal-
lenges. Tenure security can be promoted and achieved by a range of actions, such as legal recognition, demarcation and mapping, 
land titling, and eviction of unwanted intruders. People with insecure tenure face the risk that their rights to land will be threatened 
by competing claims, and even lost as a result of eviction. Without security of tenure, households are significantly impaired in their 
ability to secure sufficient food and to enjoy sustainable rural livelihoods (FAO 2002).
 ▪ Use Values are values directly related to the use of ecosystem services by humans. These values include: direct use values that 
arise from direct interaction with ecosystems (e.g., extractive resource use); indirect use values that are associated with services 
provided by resources, but without direct use (e.g., carbon sequestration); and option values, which are uses of potential value, 
reserved for future consumption.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
Community lands can generate significant social, governance, 
economic, and environmental benefits for communities and society. 
They are a primary source of livelihoods, nutrition, income, and 
employment for communities, including Indigenous Peoples, in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. Community lands 
provide security, status, social identity, and a basis for political 
relations; for many communities, they are historically, culturally, 
and spiritually significant (FAO 2014). 
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Community lands can also provide local economic 
development opportunities, particularly important 
benefits in marginalized regions (RA 2015a, 2015b). 
They can generate local benefits in the form of job 
creation and community reinvestment in health and 
education programs. Community lands are often 
associated with greater social cohesion, which can 
generate various governance dividends, such as 
reduced conflict and avoided related costs to society 
(Larson et al. 2010; Sandler 2000). 
Community lands also provide environmental 
benefits. Community forestlands provide a suite 
of ecosystem-service benefits, including carbon 
sequestration, nutrient retention, and pollination, 
which benefit local populations and society. For 
example, the forests to which communities have 
some legal rights—about one eighth of the world’s 
total—contain approximately 37.7 billion tonnes of 
carbon, which is 29 times larger than the annual 
carbon footprint of all passenger vehicles in the 
world (Stevens et al. 2014). 
A large body of literature investigates the links 
between community lands and forest outcomes 
(Ojanen et al. 2014; Robinson et al. 2014; Stevens et 
al. 2014). Several recent studies, including match-
ing analysis which controls for multiple variables, 
find that indigenous lands exhibit low deforestation 
rates. Some research shows that secure indigenous 
lands have lower deforestation rates than areas with 
similar characteristics but without tenure security; 
others find that indigenous lands have lower defor-
estation rates than land with other tenure types, 
such as government protected areas (Nelson et al. 
2001; Nepstad et al. 2006; Nelson and Chomitz 
2011; Nolte et al. 2013; Pfaff et al. 2014; Vergara-
Aseno and Potvin 2014).1
This literature dispels the argument that govern-
ment land or individual private property is required 
for sustainable forest management and use. Secure 
indigenous forestlands—hereafter tenure-secure 
indigenous (or community) forestlands—are often 
linked to low deforestation rates, significant forest 
cover, and the sustainable production of timber and 
other forest products. Land titling or other mea-
sures to secure tenure do not alone guarantee lower 
deforestation rates, at least in the short to medium 
term. Tenure security, however, is recognized as an 
important precursor to other factors or initiatives 
designed to promote sustainable management of 
indigenous forestlands.
While much is known about the local and societal 
benefits of many community forestlands, questions 
remain about the economics of securing indigenous 
and community forestland tenure. This research 
report seeks to address these matters by asking, 
“What are the costs compared to the benefits of 
securing and maintaining tenure for indigenous 
forestlands in the Amazon basin?” It builds 
on WRI’s recently published working paper, 
The Economic Costs and Benefits of Securing 
Community Forest Tenure: Evidence from Brazil 
and Guatemala (Gray et al. 2015). This report 
focuses on Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, provides 
original matching analysis on deforestation rates, 
incorporates an array of ecosystem services into the 
benefit-cost analysis, and includes a set of policy 
options and recommendations. 
The research focuses on the lands, predominantly 
forestlands, held by Indigenous Peoples in the 
Amazon basin in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia.2 
Communities that define themselves (self-recognized) 
as Indigenous Peoples are a critical component in 
the broader category of all communities. They are 
often recognized separately from other communities 
for various reasons. Indigenous Peoples typically are 
more marginalized and suffer higher rates of poverty 
and inequality than other communities (IWGIA 2015). 
Indigenous Peoples also benefit from international 
(UN 2007) and sometimes national rights that 
other communities do not enjoy (LandMark 2016). 
While focusing on indigenous lands, the research 
findings have implications for community 
forestlands around the world. A large literature 
shows that community forestlands are linked to 
positive social, economic, and environmental 
outcomes. In Mexico, many indigenous lands 
and non-indigenous community lands have 
low deforestation rates and are engaged in the 
sustainable production of timber and other forest 
products (Barry et al. 2010; Bray et al. 2005). 
Community forestlands are also linked to positive 
social and environmental outcomes in India,  
Nepal, Tanzania, and elsewhere (Acharya 2002; 
Arnold 2001). 
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1.1 Why Now?
Many governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
recognize that tenure-secure community lands can 
deliver economic wellbeing, social development, 
and environmental sustainability at the local scale, 
although few have made securing community land a 
development priority (Pearce 2016). 
The pressures on indigenous and community lands 
from different outside groups are growing. New 
roads and other infrastructure are being built; new 
hydro-electric power plants are being constructed; 
more mining, oil, and natural gas concessions are 
being allocated by governments; and large areas of 
land are being acquired for industrial agriculture 
(RRI 2014).3 Many community forestlands that 
were not previously under threat are now at risk. 
Indigenous Peoples and local communities are 
losing their lands and deforestation rates are 
increasing in many parts of the world. In Brazil, 
the deforestation rate dropped nearly 80 percent 
between 2003 and 2013 (Nogueira et al. 2015) 
but, in 2015, government data show that the rate 
of deforestation jumped by 16 percent and an area 
of forest larger than Delaware was lost (Arsenault 
2016). Land conflicts are also on the rise, many 
turning violent and resulting in a growing number 
of deaths. More land and environmental advocates 
are being threatened and slain for their efforts to 
protect indigenous and community land (Global 
Witness 2014; 2015; Watts 2016).
At the same time, international efforts designed to 
promote sustainable development and tackle global 
environmental matters are increasingly recognizing 
the contributions of tenure-secure community lands. 
Two developments are particularly noteworthy.
1. In September 2015, the international 
community launched the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) as the blueprint 
for development for the next 15 years. Land 
rights are a cross-cutting issue recognized in 
a number of Goals/Sub-Goals and Targets, 
including the following (UN GA 2015): 
 □ Sub-Goal 1.4. “By 2030, ensure that all 
men and women, in particular the poor 
and the vulnerable, have equal rights to 
economic resources, as well as access to 
basic services, ownership and control over 
land and other forms of property, inheri-
tance, natural resources, appropriate new 
technology and financial services, including 
microfinance.” 
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 □ Sub-Goal 2.3. “By 2030, double the agri-
cultural productivity and incomes of small-
scale food producers, in particular women, 
indigenous peoples, family farmers, pasto-
ralists and fishers, including through secure 
and equal access to land, other productive 
resources and inputs, knowledge, financial 
services, markets and opportunities for 
value addition and non-farm employment.” 
 □ Sub-Goal 5.a. “Undertake reforms to give 
women equal rights to economic resources, 
as well as access to ownership and control 
over land and other forms of property, 
financial services, inheritance and natural 
resources, in accordance with national laws.” 
In March 2016, the UN agreed on 230 indica-
tors to monitor the 17 SDG Goals and 169 Tar-
gets (UN ESC 2016). Several indicators address 
land rights. Indicator 1.4.2 for Sub-Goal 1.4 
addresses indigenous and community land 
rights (customary tenure is a “type of tenure”):
 □ “Proportion of total adult population with 
secure tenure rights to land, with legally 
recognized documentation and who per-
ceive their rights to land as secure, by sex 
and by type of tenure.”
The SDGs provide an important opportunity 
to mainstream community land rights in 
development.
2. In December 2015, the Conference of the Parties 
of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), involving almost 
200 countries, convened in Paris, France, to 
finalize a new agreement to curb climate change. 
In preparation for the negotiations, countries 
publicly outlined the post-2020 climate actions 
they intend to take under the new international 
agreement, known as their Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs).  
 
The NDCs can help determine whether the 
world is put on a path toward a low-carbon, 
climate-resilient future and therefore constitute 
critically important commitments. Colombia, 
for example, committed to reducing its 
emissions by an estimated 67 million tonnes 
of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) by 
2030 and, with international support, by 
an estimated 100MtCO2e (Government of 
Colombia 2015). Indigenous lands in the 
Amazon basin store considerable carbon 
(Walker et al. 2015) and securing these lands 
can contribute to meeting national climate 
change commitments (Stevens et al. 2014). Yet, 
the NDCs for Bolivia (Government of Bolivia 
2015), Brazil (Government of Brazil 2015), and 
Colombia (Government of Colombia 2015) 
do not make any specific commitments to 
securing indigenous or other community land 
rights (RRI 2016: Appendix 1). In addition to 
government support, the newly established 
Green Climate Fund and other climate funds 
are well positioned to invest in securing 
indigenous and community forestland tenure 
to mitigate climate change. These and other 
milestones provide unique opportunities for 
global actions to secure land and forest rights 
for communities.
This research focuses 
on indigenous lands, 
but has implications for 
community forestlands 
around the world. A large 
literature shows that 
community forestlands 
are linked to positive 
social, economic, and 
environmental outcomes.
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Research on tenure-secure indigenous and com-
munity lands, particularly the economic aspects, 
can help governments improve policies to maxi-
mize social and environmental benefits. Building 
on the method developed in WRI’s The Economic 
Costs and Benefits of Securing Community For-
est Tenure: Evidence from Brazil and Guatemala 
(Gray et al. 2015), this research report shifts the 
focus to indigenous lands in the Amazon basin. It 
aims to inform technical leads in the land, forest, 
and financial sectors of governments, as well as 
funding agencies, on the economic gains achievable 
from securing indigenous forestland rights. Such 
information can encourage these audiences to make 
new investments in recognizing and protecting 
community land rights. It may also help Indigenous 
Peoples, communities, and their partners to make 
economic arguments for securing their land rights.
Following this introduction (Section 1), Section 
2 provides some background on community land 
rights, including the geographic extent of commu-
nity lands and forestlands, and the importance of 
secure tenure for generating social, environmental, 
and economic benefits. Section 3 provides brief 
summaries of indigenous land rights in Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Colombia. Sections 4 and 5 provide an 
overview of the economic benefits and costs associ-
ated with tenure-secure indigenous forestlands. 
Section 6 presents the economic valuation method 
and results of the benefit-cost analysis for Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Colombia. Finally, Section 7 provides a 
summary of key challenges to indigenous lands in 
the Amazon basin and presents a number of policy 
recommendations.
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SECTION II
BACKGROUND
The precise amount of community land in the world is not known. 
The area has been estimated at more than half the world’s land 
(Pearce 2016), or as high as 65 percent or more of the global 
land area, involving up to 2.5 billion people (Alden Wily 2011). 
An estimated 22 percent of the world’s land is held by Indigenous 
Peoples (Nakashima et al. 2012; Sobrevila 2008). Communal land 
is found in all continents of the world except Antarctica, with the 
largest area located in Africa (Alden Wily 2011). 
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Without strong legal protections and enforcement 
of rights, communities are vulnerable to losing 
their land and natural resources. Only 10 percent of 
the world’s land, however, is legally recognized as 
belonging to communities, with another 8 percent 
designated by governments for communities (RRI 
2015).4 The remainder of the world’s community 
land is not formally recognized in statutory law.5
 
Forests cover 31 percent of the world’s land surface, 
or just over 4 billion hectares (FAO 2014), with com-
munities holding and using a considerable portion 
of forests. However, only a small fraction of com-
munity forestland is officially recognized by statutory 
law, and even less is protected and securely held by 
Indigenous Peoples and communities. In 2013, com-
munities held some legal rights to at least 511 million 
hectares of forest—about 15.5 percent of the world’s 
forests (RRI 2014) (see Figure 1).6 This represents 
an important increase over the last decade: in 2002, 
communities had formal rights to 11.3 percent of the 
world’s forest (RRI 2014). While governments are 
increasingly recognizing community rights to forests, 
in 2013, an estimated 73 percent of the world’s 
forests was still state controlled—down from 77.9 
percent in 2002 (RRI 2014). Much of this govern-
ment forest is actually community forestland held 
under customary tenure systems. 
2.1 The Importance of Tenure Security 
Secure tenure helps communities to protect their 
lands from unwelcome threats and challenges. 
Tenure substantially affects people’s ability and 
incentive to use and manage their land and natural 
resources. The incentives depend upon expecta-
tions of rights over the returns on investments and, 
therefore, on the nature of land and resource ten-
ure. Clear and secure land tenure can encourage or 
induce a range of investments of labor, resources, 
and other assets (Deininger 2003; Goldstein and 
Udry 2008). Communities often have more incen-
tives to produce goods and services when their 
lands and resources are secure than when they are 
at risk (FAO 2002; Place 2009; Sandler 2000).
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Figure 1  |  Forest Ownership, 2002–2013 (million hectares)
Source: RRI (2014)
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While secure tenure creates incentives for 
communities to invest in their land, the types of 
investments and their effects on forests can depend 
on a range of other factors (Baland and Platteau 
1996; Ferretti-Gallon and Busch 2014; Larson and 
Lewis-Mendoza 2012; Pacheco and Benatti 2015). 
These investments can support sustainable forest 
management and lead to the continued provisioning 
of vital social, economic, and ecosystem-service 
benefits, or they can usher in alternative land 
uses that result in the loss or degradation of 
forestland. In some cases, forestlands generate 
local benefits sufficient to encourage investments 
in sustainable land and forest  management. 
Some governments also place restrictions on how 
community forestlands are used or managed, 
helping to maintain intact forests. For example, 
laws may prohibit the commercial exploitation 
of forest products or prevent communities from 
leasing or selling their lands. In Brazil, the Forest 
Crime Law obligates landholders to preserve legal 
forest reserves in an area equal to 80 percent of 
total landholding in the Amazon basin (Pacheco 
and Benatti 2015). Governments can also provide 
performance payments or other positive incentives 
(CGD 2015; de Koning et al. 2011), encouraging 
communities to protect their forests. 
Alternatively, public policies or other measures may 
establish incentives that encourage investments, 
leading to the clearing of forests for other forms of 
land use, such as cash crops or pasture for livestock 
(Ferretti-Gallon and Busch 2014; McFarland et 
al. 2015). For example, government subsidies for 
agriculture can exacerbate deforestation (Kissinger 
2015). As a consequence, the relationship between 
land tenure and local wellbeing is complex. In 
some regions, land-tenure recognition is linked to 
new investments, and substantial productivity and 
income gains. In other areas, securing land rights 
does not guarantee better livelihoods in the form 
of increased agricultural productivity, income, or 
other relevant outcomes (Lawry et al. 2016; Ribot 
and Peluso 2003).
Insecure tenure, however, can lead to expropria-
tion of and encroachment on community lands. 
As a result, weak tenure commonly discourages 
people and communities from making long-term 
investments in their lands and often encourages the 
over exploitation of the land and natural resources 
to maximize short-term benefits. Significant, 
long-term investments are risky when communi-
ties have little assurance that they will be able to 
capture the resulting benefits. And research shows 
that the degradation or loss of land often leads to 
local hardships and increased poverty (Barbier 
2000; Duraiappah 1998). Insecure tenure also 
has national and global implications. In addition 
to the loss of critical ecosystem services, undocu-
mented and contested land rights can adversely 
affect national economies. The World Bank recently 
reported that economic growth in Africa was being 
held back by confusion over land ownership and 
linked this to the continent’s high poverty rates 
(Byamugisha 2013).
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There are several rights that communities may enjoy 
and that governments have the power to legally 
recognize. The bundle of rights framework developed 
by the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) includes:
 ▪ ACCESS: right to enter or pass through the forest.
 ▪ WITHDRAWAL OR USE: right to benefit from the 
forest’s resources.
 ▪ MANAGEMENT: right to make decisions about 
forest resources and for a forest area over which the 
community has rights of access and withdrawal or 
use.
 ▪ EXCLUSION: right to refuse access to and use of 
the forest.
 ▪ DUE PROCESS AND COMPENSATION: right to 
legally challenge a government’s efforts to take one, 
several, or all of the community’s forest rights.
 ▪ DURATION: the length of time a community may 
exercise its rights—either limited or recognized in 
perpetuity.
 ▪ ALIENATION: right to transfer the forest to another 
by sale, lease, or some other means.
Source: RRI (2012)
BOX 1  |  BUNDLE OF LAND RIGHTS
2.2 Factors that Can Contribute  
to Tenure Security
Many factors contribute to tenure security of com-
munity lands and these may vary by context and 
circumstances. Two common factors are: 
Legal Recognition of Community Land Rights 
Statutory laws that recognize community lands 
can help secure tenure. Laws are supportive when 
they recognize all rights customarily held by 
communities as lawful forms of land ownership, 
and protect customary tenure to the same degree as 
other forms of tenure (e.g., freehold and leasehold). 
The bundle of land rights may include the rights 
of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, 
and alienation. Each right in the bundle provides 
communities with certain authorities over their 
lands (Box 1). Land rights may also include rights 
to certain natural resources on or below the 
surface of the land (Veit and Larsen 2013; WRI 
2013). Large bundles of rights commonly provide 
communities with considerable control over their 
lands and, therefore, often more security. Laws are 
also supportive if they require the government to 
provide communities with a formal title to their lands; 
recognize the community as having legal authority 
over its land; recognize that customary rights are held 
in perpetuity; require community consent before 
any outside actor may acquire community land; and 
other provisions (LandMark 2016).
While many governments around the world now 
recognize customary tenure systems, few have 
established the strong legal protections needed to 
secure community land. The laws in most countries 
do not provide Indigenous Peoples and communi-
ties with complete bundles of land rights. In gen-
eral, the laws in Latin American countries provide 
communities with larger bundles of land rights 
than those in other regions of the world. The laws 
in African countries recognize small bundles of land 
rights (RRI 2012). Few African countries provide 
communities with any rights to subsurface miner-
als, oil, or natural gas (WRI 2013), and 95 percent 
of the world’s governments restrict community use 
of forest resources (RRI 2012).
In addition to providing communities with lim-
ited bundles of rights, some governments are also 
increasingly exercising their authority to restrict 
(police powers) or extinguish (expropriation) land 
rights, including community land rights. The use 
of these powers is commonly restricted to public 
purposes, such as building public roads and other 
infrastructure but, around the world, governments 
are widening the scope of developments that can 
be considered public purposes, further threatening 
tenure security (Tagliarino and Verstappen 2016; 
Veit 2010). In Tanzania and other countries, the 
laws authorize the President to declare any develop-
ment a public purpose.
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Protection of Land Rights 
While supportive laws provide communities with 
a layer of tenure security, they must be effectively 
implemented to actually protect land rights when 
community lands are threatened. Implementation 
can be achieved in various ways. Well-resourced 
government agencies with explicit responsibilities 
to monitor and protect community lands from 
unwanted intruders and illegal activities can help to 
ensure that communities realize their land rights. 
Communities that understand their land rights 
and have capable village institutions can patrol 
and monitor their lands. Civil society organizations 
and development assistance agencies can help 
secure tenure by supporting community efforts 
to map and demarcate their lands, prepare land-
use and management plans, and acquire formal 
land documents. In practice, however, many 
governments lack the political will or the human 
and financial resources needed to document and 
adequately protect community lands. Many actually 
undermine tenure security by allocating long-term 
concessions for agricultural plantations, mining 
operations, and oil and natural gas extraction on 
indigenous and community land (Land Matrix 2016).
While supportive laws 
provide communities 
with a layer of tenure 
security, they must be 
effectively implemented 
to actually protect land 
rights when community 
lands are threatened.
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SECTION III
OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
AREAS IN BOLIVIA, 
BRAZIL, AND COLOMBIA
Research for this report focuses on indigenous land in the Amazon 
basin—the majority of which is forestland—in Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Colombia. Each country includes a significant portion of the 
Amazon forest, and the governments have formally recognized many 
indigenous lands and granted Indigenous Peoples relatively large 
bundles of land rights. 
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Research for this report focuses on indigenous  
land in the Amazon basin—the majority of which  
is forestland7—in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia  
(Figure 2) for four principal reasons:
 ▪ Each country includes a significant portion of 
the Amazon forest, the largest remaining tropi-
cal forest expanse in the world (Box 2).
 ▪ Governments in these countries formally rec-
ognize indigenous lands, and grant Indigenous 
Peoples relatively large bundles of land rights 
(RRI 2012; Stevens et al. 2014).
 ▪ The three countries include diverse Amazon 
biome types with unique ecosystem services 
as well as different procedures and associated 
costs for securing tenure. 
 ▪ Many indigenous lands in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia have been mapped and the spatial 
data are available for analysis.
The study area for each country is described below: 
Figure 2  |  Map of the Amazon Basin Showing the Indigenous Lands in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia
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Bolivia 
Indigenous people account for 62 percent of 
Bolivia’s total population of about 10.5 million 
and belong to 36 recognized ethnic groups. An 
additional 30 percent of the population is mestizo, 
having mixed European and indigenous ancestry 
(IWGIA 2015). Tierras Comunitarias de Origen 
(TCOs or Native Community Lands) are formally 
recognized indigenous lands in the Bolivian 
Amazon basin.8 Indigenous Peoples are entitled 
to obtain TCOs, which recognize their exclusive 
and perpetual rights to use, manage, and benefit 
from the land and many natural resources. The 
government retains no formal ownership of these 
lands. Indigenous Peoples are prohibited from 
dividing or selling their land (Cano et al. 2015; 
Vidal 2015a). They have the right of Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent (FPIC)9 although it is often not 
well implemented. While there are no restrictions 
on the use of forest resources for traditional and 
subsistence uses, the commercial use of forest 
products is subject to conditions described in a 
government-approved sustainable management 
plan and the annual payment of a fee.10 Indigenous 
Peoples are not subject to tax on agricultural 
property (Cano et al. 2015; Vidal 2015a).
 
The Bolivian Amazon basin covers about 
67,348,000 ha or 62 percent of the country’s total 
area. The research for this report focused on the 
TCOs for which maps are publicly available (Figure 
2).  These maps represent a total area of about 
10,964,600 ha (Box 2). The Bolivian Amazon basin 
(boundaries defined using hydrographic criteria) 
includes four distinct biomes and TCOs are present 
in each biome: 65 percent of TCOs are located in 
the tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf forests 
biome; 16 percent in the tropical and subtropi-
cal dry broadleaf forests biome; 16 percent in the 
tropical and subtropical grasslands, savanna, and 
shrublands biome; and the remaining 3 percent in 
the montane grasslands and shrublands biome.
BOX 2  |  THE AMAZON BASIN IN BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, AND COLOMBIA
AREA (HA) OF INDIGENOUS LAND IN BIOME (PERCENTAGE OF INDIGENOUS LAND)
Bolivia Brazil Colombia
Tropical and Subtropical Moist  
Broadleaf Forests
7,133,300 (65%) 97,631,700 (88%) 26,004,400 (97%)
Tropical and Subtropical Dry  
Broadleaf Forests
1,772,900 (16%) 669,800 (1%) 200 (<1%)
Tropical and Subtropical Grasslands, 
Savanna, Shrublands
1,720,400 (16%) 12,906,700 (12%) 727,400 (3%)
Montane Grasslands and Shrublands 338,000 (3%) 0 3,000 (<1%)
Flooded Grasslands and Savannas 0 30,400 (<1%) 0
Total Area of Indigenous Land  
in Amazon Basin
10,964,600 111,238,600 26,752,500
Total Area of Amazon Basin 67,348,000 509,490,100 49,609,800
Calculated at WRI using the following geospatial datasets: INCODER (2015); Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (2012); FUNAI (2014); Olsen et al. (2001).
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Brazil
According to the 2010 census for Brazil, there 
were almost 900,000 people who self-identify as 
indigenous, or 0.47 percent of the total population. 
There are 305 different ethnic groups, speaking 274 
indigenous languages (IWGIA 2015). In 2007, the 
government confirmed the presence of 67 uncon-
tacted tribes living in voluntary isolation, more than 
any other country in the world.
About 60 percent (509,490,100 ha) of Brazil is 
recognized in national law to be part of the “Legal 
Amazon” (boundaries defined by using administra-
tive criteria). This research focuses on the approxi-
mately 111,238,600 ha of land in the Brazilian  
Amazon basin that is formally recognized as 
indigenous land and for which maps are publically 
available (Figure 2). Brazil has the largest land 
areas under statutorily recognized community 
control in South America, most by Indigenous 
Peoples.11 Indigenous lands are located throughout 
the country but most reside in the Amazon basin. 
Brazil’s “Legal Amazon” includes four biomes; 
about 88 percent of indigenous lands are found in 
the tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf for-
est biome; 12 percent are found in the tropical and 
subtropical grasslands, savanna, and shrublands 
biome; 1 percent in the tropical and subtropical dry 
broadleaf forests biome; and a very small fraction in 
the flooded grasslands and savannas biome (Box 3).
 
The indigenous lands in the Brazilian Amazon 
basin are formally recognized and mapped in one 
of four types of collective tenure (Box 3): about 
111,057,000 ha (99.8 percent of indigenous lands) 
are formally recognized as Terra Indígena; 14,000 
ha are recognized as Dominial Indígena; 43,000 
ha are recognized as Interditada; and 253,000 ha 
are Reserva Indígena. Terra Indígena are inhab-
ited exclusively by Indigenous Peoples and are 
legally recognized as conservation or sustainable-
use protected areas. While these lands are public 
property, Indigenous Peoples have perpetual rights 
to the soil and water, the rights to use and manage 
Under current legislation (CF/88, Law 6001/73 - Indian Statute, Decree n.º1775/96), indigenous lands can be categorized as 
follows:
Terra Indígena (Indigenous Lands Traditionally Occupied): These lands are legally recognized as indigenous lands referred 
to in art. 231 of the 1988 Constitution, original right of Indigenous Peoples, whose demarcation process is regulated by Decree 
No. 1775/96.
Reserva Indígena (Indigenous Reserves): These lands are donated by third parties or acquired by the federal state from 
anywhere in the country. They are intended for permanent occupation, use, and benefit by Indigenous Peoples (Law Nº 
6.001/19 December 1973, art. 26). The lands belong to the state, but are reserved as indigenous lands. Many indigenous 
reserves were established in the first half of the twentieth century. An important difference between indigenous lands and 
indigenous reserves is in the procedures to recognize the land; the process to establish indigenous land is strictly regulated. 
Dominial Indígena (Proprietary Land): These private lands are the property of Indigenous Peoples; the designation 
constitutes full ownership by the Indigenous Peoples or individual members. Proprietary lands are regulated by the terms of the 
civil code (Law 6001/73, art. 32).
Interditada (Interdicted): These lands are reserved (blocked) for the use of Indigenous Peoples in isolation; they may or 
may not become indigenous land. These lands are interdicted by the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI) to protect isolated 
Indigenous Peoples from third-party interference (restrictions are placed on third parties’ access to and use of these lands). 
These lands are governed by Decree No. 1775/96.
Sources: FUNAI (2015); Heck et al. (2005) 
BOX 3  |   TYPES OF TENURE ON INDIGENOUS LANDS IN BRAZIL 
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the forest, and the right to exclude others from their 
land. Many forest resources may be used for com-
mercial purposes subject to a government-approved 
sustainable forest management plan, but cutting 
trees for sale also requires authorization by statute 
(e.g., National Congress) (Clay et al. 2000; Fearn-
side 2003a). The Constitution (Arts. 176, 231(3)) 
provides that minerals belong to the state, but no 
party can access them unless authorized by stat-
ute. The government has not generally authorized 
access to mineral resources in indigenous lands, but 
this is the subject of perennial legal maneuvers, leg-
islative bills, and constitutional arguments (Davis 
2013; RRI and ISA 2014). The Constitution (Art. 
231(3)) permits the legislature to authorize dams on 
indigenous lands. Roads are generally barred from 
indigenous lands, but have been built on some lands.
Colombia
The National Statistics Department estimates 
the indigenous population (pueblos indígenas) in 
2012 at around 1,450,000 people or 3.5 percent of 
the national population (IWGIA 2015). About 80 
percent of the indigenous population is located in 
the Andean departments of Cauca, Nariño, and La 
Guajira (Belazelkoska 2013). The Amazon basin of 
Colombia is sparsely populated, but is home to over 
70 different Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA 2015).
Approximately 44 percent (49,609,800 ha) of 
Colombia is in the Amazon basin (boundaries 
defined using hydrographic criteria). About 54 
percent (26,752,500 ha) of the Colombian Amazon 
basin is formally recognized as indigenous land 
(Figure 2).12 The vast majority of this indigenous 
land (97 percent) is in the tropical and subtropical 
moist broadleaf forests biome; 3 percent is located 
in the tropical and subtropical grasslands, savanna, 
and shrublands biome; and small fractions are 
located in the tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf 
forests and the montane shrublands and grasslands 
biomes (Box 2). 
Indigenous lands in the Colombian Amazon basin 
are formally recognized as Resguardo Indígena 
(Indigenous Reserves). The inhabitants of Res-
guardo Indígenas have legal rights similar to those 
in the Terra Indígena in Brazil, including the rights 
to use and manage their forests, to benefit from 
timber and non-timber forest resources for subsis-
tence and traditional uses, and to exclude outsid-
ers. Commercial use of forest products requires 
government approval. The law recognizes the right 
of Indigenous Peoples to govern their lands with 
autonomy according to their own customary rules, 
although the lands are state-owned and cannot be 
sold (Vidal 2015b). The 1991 Constitution defines 
political, administrative, and financial decentraliza-
tion in Colombia, including Indigenous Territorial 
Entities. Resguardo Indígena can become Indig-
enous Territorial Entities but few have been estab-
lished. In 2011, Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
“unconditionally” recognized FPIC for Indigenous 
Peoples and halted several industrial projects for 
not properly consulting or gaining the consent of 
affected Indigenous Peoples (Schertow 2011).
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SECTION IV
ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
OF TENURE-SECURE 
INDIGENOUS 
FORESTLANDS
Secure tenure over forestlands creates incentives for Indigenous 
Peoples to protect forests and sustainably produce goods and services. 
Secure tenure can also promote other economic benefits by reducing 
conflict and enhancing mechanisms for collective action, and by 
encouraging job creation and actions that support local populations 
(e.g., local reinvestment in education and health programs).
WRI.org        30
4.1 Overview of Benefit Categories 
This research report identifies three principal types 
of economic benefits: ecosystem-service benefits, 
collective-action benefits, and other social benefits. 
It does not attempt to assess the total economic 
value of all benefits provided by the Amazon for-
ests. Rather, it quantifies a few ecosystem-service 
benefits resulting from reduced deforestation on 
forestlands where land rights are clearly recognized 
for Indigenous Peoples. To investigate the effec-
tiveness of tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
in reducing deforestation, an original matching 
analysis is conducted for the study areas. It com-
pares and estimates the annual deforestation rates 
of forestlands with similar characteristics within 
and outside indigenous forestlands. The differences 
between deforestation rates inside and outside 
indigenous forestlands are used to calculate the 
total forest areas that are protected from deforesta-
tion each year under land-rights regimes, as well as 
the associated multiple ecosystem-service benefits, 
with a primary focus on carbon benefits. 
1.  Ecosystem-Service Benefits
 Ecosystem services are the benefits that people 
obtain from ecosystems. Forests in the Amazon 
basin provide a variety of goods and services that 
benefit humankind both locally (local benefits) and 
globally (global benefits). Global ecosystem-service 
benefits provided by Amazon forests include, for 
example, carbon sequestration. Locally, forests 
contribute to livelihoods in the form of both mon-
etary benefits (e.g., employment and direct income 
generation) and non-monetary benefits (e.g., 
strengthened climate resilience).   
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) 
organizes ecosystem services into four categories: 
supporting, regulating, provisioning, and cultural 
services. Examples of forest-ecosystem services for 
each category are described in Table 1.   
 
Despite challenges of measuring and valuing 
ecosystem services, many studies have attempted to 
estimate the total value of forest-ecosystem services 
for demonstrating the multiple co-benefits of forest 
conservation and supporting sustainable forest 
management policies. For example, The Economics 
of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB 2009) esti-
mates that the average value of ecosystem services 
from tropical forests (including climate regulation) 
is $6,120 (2007 US$) per hectare per year, with a 
maximum value range to $16,362 per hectare per 
year.13 Among the valued ecosystem services, the 
provisioning of food and raw materials represents 
only a small portion (about 8 percent) of the total 
value, whereas the highest values are found associ-
ated with climate regulation (about 32 percent), 
regulation of water flows (about 22 percent), 
and erosion prevention (11 percent). These value 
estimates were taken from 109 original studies that 
have reported representative values for different 
ecosystem-services categories. Similarly, de Groot 
et al. (2012) estimated the total economic value of 
tropical forests at an average value of $5,264 (2007 
US$)14 per hectare per year and Costanza et al. 
(2014) estimated an average value of forest-ecosys-
tem services at $3,800 per hectare in 2011.15 
2. Collective-Action and  
Conflict-Resolution Benefits 
In addition to ecosystem services, tenure-secure 
indigenous forestlands can also produce other eco-
nomic benefits by reducing conflict and enhancing 
mechanisms for collective action.16 When Indig-
enous Peoples have clear and enforceable rights, 
they may be better able to work with each other as 
well as with external stakeholders to manage their 
forests. This can generate extra benefits by reducing 
some of the transaction costs of forest management 
(e.g., reduced need for meetings and staff) both for 
Indigenous Peoples and for other stakeholders.  
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Table 1  |  Forest-Ecosystem Services
ECOSYSTEM- 
SERVICE TYPE
EXAMPLES OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES VALUE TYPE SCALE OF THE BENEFITS 
Regulating
Carbon sequestration; regulation of local climate dynamics; 
hydrological services; water-flow regulation; water filtration; 
erosion prevention; pollination
Indirect use value
Mainly local but also global 
(e.g., carbon sequestration)
Provisioning Food; water supply; timber and non-timber products; medicinal 
products; genetic resources
Direct use value Mainly local but also global 
Supporting Habitat for species; genetic diversity Indirect use value Local and global 
Cultural Recreation and tourism; sacred ritual and burial sites; habitat; 
educational uses; existence 
Direct and indirect 
use value; non-use 
value
Mainly local and to some 
extent global
Source: Based on TEEB (2009)
Clear land rights and land governance roles can also 
reduce conflict costs for Indigenous Peoples and 
other stakeholders. Many forest-related conflicts 
result from differing interpretations of rights 
and tenure and many such conflicts turn violent. 
Examples include disputes between Indigenous 
Peoples and other communities over boundaries, 
and disputes between forest concession-holders and 
Indigenous Peoples over access to forest products, 
decision-making, and benefit sharing (De Koning et 
al. 2008).  
 
Conflicts over weak land rights can disrupt economic 
growth in many ways. Indigenous Peoples may 
spend resources guarding and protecting their lands 
rather than using them for productive activities. 
Further, Indigenous Peoples may have less incentive 
to produce goods and services if their lands are at 
risk (Sandler 2000). Indigenous Peoples with secure 
tenure who act together to manage forestlands can 
also help reduce transaction costs of coordinating 
actions and communications with secondary and 
external stakeholders (Larson et al. 2010). Indig-
enous forestland networks are known to increase 
their access to forest resources and markets, build 
capacity of local groups, and expand their interface 
with decision-makers (Larson et al. 2010).
3. Other Social Benefits 
Secure tenure can encourage job creation and 
actions that support Indigenous Peoples and 
other communities (e.g., local reinvestment in 
education and health programs). A multitude 
of other social benefits is possible when forest 
productivity is increased and ecosystem services 
are maintained through avoided deforestation. For 
example, when Indigenous Peoples are better able 
to manage their forests and increase the provision 
of ecosystem-service benefits, they can create 
more jobs and generate more revenues to support 
social programs. In many countries, indigenous 
forestlands serve as regional employment centers, 
supporting livelihoods for indigenous people as 
well as migrants who come seeking work. Often, 
local forestry enterprises reinvest a portion of their 
profits from timber sales into education, health, or 
other social programs.
In sum, the benefits of tenure-secure indigenous 
forestlands can support Indigenous Peoples and 
other communities locally and globally. Forest 
ecosystems may directly benefit Indigenous Peoples 
in the form of income generation from selling forest 
products, or indirectly support local livelihoods by 
providing regulating and supporting ecosystem 
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services. Forests can also help regulate and 
retain soil nutrients, and contribute to regulating 
local climate dynamics that are important for 
biodiversity conservation and agricultural 
productivity. In addition, these ecosystems 
can generate global benefits, such as carbon 
sequestration, along with other climate regulating 
services, contributing to global climate change 
mitigation efforts. 
Collective-action and conflict-resolution benefits 
accrue principally to communities, and to the local 
and national stakeholders who interact with them 
directly. Similarly, social benefits apply mostly to 
communities that benefit from improved educa-
tion and health care, but may also be felt regionally 
and nationally because governments may need to 
invest less in health care and education subsidies. 
However, the collective-action benefits and social 
benefits from indigenous forestlands are not as well 
documented as some ecosystem-service benefits. 
For instance, the potentially avoided transaction 
costs of forest management associated with tenure-
secure indigenous forestland, and the amount of 
income generated—whether by direct extractive 
uses of indigenous forestland resources (e.g., timber 
harvest) or other conservation activities (e.g., pay-
ments for ecosystem services)—that is reinvested in 
health and education programs by communities, are 
not well known. As a result, this research does not 
include these benefits in the benefit-cost analysis.
 
4. 2 Assessing the Ecosystem- 
Service Benefits of Tenure-Secure 
Indigenous Forestlands
The assessment of ecosystem-service benefits of 
tenure-secure indigenous forestlands consists of 
four steps (Figure 3). First, a matching analysis is 
conducted to estimate the total area of indigenous 
forestlands that is saved annually from deforesta-
tion due to the presence of tenure security. Second, 
selected ecosystem services provided by the annu-
ally avoided deforestation area are quantified. 
Third, the unit values of the selected ecosystem 
services (measured in $/ha) provided by indigenous 
forestlands are estimated based on the literature. 
Last, the unit value of ecosystem services is multi-
plied by the quantity of these services to calculate 
the total economic benefits of tenure-secure indig-
enous forestlands.17
Additional information regarding each of the four 
steps is provided below.
Figure 3  |   Four Steps for Assessing the Ecosystem-Service Benefits of  
Tenure-Secure Indigenous Forestlands
STEP 1
Estimate the area of 
community forests that 
are prevented from 
deforestation annually
STEP 3
Estimate the unit  
value of selected  
ecosystem services 
provided by tropical 
forests
STEP 2
Quantify the total flows 
of ecosystem services 
provided by avoided 
deforestation area
STEP 4
Calculate the total 
benefits of selected 
ecosystem services 
from tenure-secure 
indigenous forestlands
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4.2.1 Matching Analysis for Estimating  
the Impacts of Tenure-Secure Indigenous 
Forestlands on Deforestation
The main challenge faced in measuring the effect 
on deforestation of tenure-secure indigenous 
forestlands lies in not being able to observe the 
counterfactual—what the rate of deforestation on 
indigenous forestlands would be absent tenure 
security. A common solution is to use the contem-
poraneous rate of deforestation on untitled land as 
a proxy for the counterfactual. But this strategy is 
complicated by the fact that Indigenous Peoples are 
not randomly sited. Rather, as the data illustrate, 
Indigenous Peoples tend to be sited on land with 
preexisting geophysical and socioeconomic charac-
teristics that stem deforestation. Therefore, mea-
suring the effect of tenure security on deforestation 
by simply comparing the average deforestation rate 
inside indigenous forestlands and outside—with 
the latter average serving as the counterfactual—
would conflate the effects on deforestation with the 
effects of the preexisting characteristics of the land, 
thereby generating a biased result. For example, 
in Bolivia, compared to land outside, land inside 
indigenous forestlands tends to be further from 
large population centers, less populated, and in 
areas with relatively low opportunity costs, all char-
acteristics that typically slow deforestation. Unless 
these variables are controlled for, the research 
would attribute the relatively low rates of deforesta-
tion inside indigenous forestlands to the security of 
these lands, when at least part may be due to these 
other characteristics.
To help control for such bias, a matching analysis 
is conducted. Matching analysis refers to a statisti-
cal impact-evaluation technique widely used in 
economic evaluations of policy impact. Matching 
analysis seeks to explicitly force “apples to apples” 
comparisons by pairing protected and unprotected 
locations that are similar in their landscape char-
acteristics (Joppa and Pfaff 2010), in order to allow 
for the isolation of a specific policy-change impact 
(e.g., establishment of tenure security).  
The effect of tenure security is measured by com-
paring the rate of deforestation inside indigenous 
forestlands with the rate on forestland outside that 
is similar in terms of the characteristics that drive 
deforestation. More specifically, following Andam 
et al. (2008), Blackman et al. (2015) and others, a 
quasi-random sample of points inside and outside 
of tenure-secure indigenous forestlands is selected 
in a study area. Next, a subsample of matched 
control points outside indigenous forestlands is 
selected that are observationally similar to the 
points inside and the effect of tenure security is 
measured (known as the average treatment effect 
on the treated—ATT) by comparing the average 
rates of deforestation on points inside indigenous 
forestlands and matched points outside.  
A variety of techniques can be used to match points 
with tenure security with points not secure and 
to compare outcomes on each subsample (Cali-
endo and Kopeinig 2008; Stuart 2010). To ensure 
robustness, three estimators are used: nearest 
neighbor one-to-one propensity score matching,18 
nearest neighbor one-to-eight propensity score 
matching, and a probit regression19 with matched 
control points. In addition, a “naïve” estimator is 
used that does not control for pre-existing land 
characteristics—the simple difference between the 
average rates of deforestation on all tenure-secure 
and tenure-insecure points in the sample. The 
purpose of this effort is to shed light on the value of 
the matching approach.
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Table 2  |  Variables Used in Matching Analysis
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE UNITS
Outcome
CLEAR Cleared during 2000–2012 Hansen et al. (2013) 0/1
Treatment
TITLE Location of indigenous lands LandMark 0/1
Control
ALTITUDE Elevation Farr et al. (2007) m
SLOPE Slope (100*tan(n angle/180)) Farr et al. (2007) %
NORTHFACE Aspect = N, NW or NE Farr et al. (2007) 0/1
CARBON Above-ground biomass density Saatchi et al. (2011) mg/ha
TRAVEL TIME Time to nearest city w/pop. >50K Nelson (2008) min
POPULATION Population density CIESIN–CIAT (2005) person/ha
OPPORTUNITY COSTS Gross potential agricultural revenue Naidoo and Iwamura (2007) US $/ha
RAIN Average monthly precipitation Hijmans et al. (2005) mm
TEMPERATURE Average monthly temperature Hijmans et al. (2005) °C
BIOME Terrestrial biome (forest, grassland, etc.) Olson et al. (2001) n/a
PROTECTED Protected area IUCN–UNEP (2007) n/a
The deforestation data are derived from Hansen 
et al. (2013), a data set covering the global tropics 
that maps forest loss each year from 2001–2012 at 
a scale of 30m × 30m (Table 2). A variety of data is 
used to control for the pre-existing characteristics 
of land that may affect deforestation, including 
information on altitude, slope, directional orienta-
tion, biomass density, travel time to large popula-
tion centers, opportunity costs of retaining land in 
forest, historical precipitation and temperature, and 
forest biome.    
The difference in deforestation rates between 
tenure-secure areas and matched plots (i.e., the no-
policy scenario) is estimated. The annual avoided 
deforestation impact in a country is the difference 
between these rates, which is then applied to the 
total area of tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
located in each forest biome to estimate the annual 
area of avoided deforestation by different Amazon 
biomes in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. Account-
ing for biome difference is essential for valuing the 
carbon sequestration benefits due to the variation 
of carbon stocks. The area to which the deforesta-
tion-rate impacts can be applied shrinks every year 
because the estimated deforestation rate is not zero 
and thus the annual total avoidable deforestation 
decreases over time. 
Results from the matching analysis undertaken 
for this report are presented in Table 3 (technical 
details are included in Appendix 2). The average 
annual deforestation rates are the annual average 
of the deforestation rates estimated by matching 
analysis for a period of 12 years between 2000 and 
2012. Overall, after controlling for the other factors 
(see Appendix 2), tenure-secure indigenous forest-
lands are correlated with substantially lower rates 
of deforestation in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. 
That is, the annual deforestation rates inside the 
tenure-secure indigenous forestlands are signifi-
cantly lower than those outside in all three coun-
tries, suggesting that securing indigenous forest-
land tenure contributed to reducing deforestation 
in these areas between 2000 and 2012. Further, 
these countries have undertaken a regularization 
and titling process to recognize indigenous lands 
since the 1990s and in particular in the past decade. 
The effects on reducing deforestation in many areas 
are already observable, which suggests that defores-
tation rates have declined over time and that these 
effects will likely continue if the indigenous forest-
lands remain secure.
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Table 3  |   Estimated Effect of Tenure-Secure Indigenous Forestlands on Deforestation  
in Bolivian, Brazilian, and Colombian Amazon Basin, 2000–2012
COUNTRY
OBSERVED ACTUAL 
DEFORESTATION  
(INSIDE INDIGENOUS 
FORESTLANDS)
ESTIMATED 
COUNTERFACTUAL 
DEFORESTATION  
(OUTSIDE INDIGENOUS 
FORESTLANDS)
EFFECT (AVERAGE  
TREATMENT EFFECT  
ON THE TREATED)
(12-year 
total, %)
(12-year 
average, %)
(12-year 
total, %)
(12-year 
average, %)
(12-year total, 
% point)
(12-year 
average, 
% point)
(total, 
% change)
(12-year 
average, 
% change)
Bolivia 1.77 0.15 5.2 0.43 -3.43 -0.28 -63.69 -5.31
Brazil20 0.67 0.06 1.74 0.15 -1.07 -0.09 -57.33 -4.78
Colombia 0.43 0.04 1.01 0.08 -0.58 -0.05 -48.20 -4.02
Source: Matching analysis detailed in Appendix 2. Estimated counterfactual deforestation is the deforestation rate on observationally similar areas outside of indigenous 
lands. Effects estimated using probit model with matched controls. The last two columns are the estimated percentage change in deforestation using the observed actual rate 
of deforestation as a baseline. All effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
In this study, matching analysis provides a fun-
damental basis for assessing the deforestation 
rates for the Amazon forests in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia. Although the method has a solid scien-
tific foundation and relies on statistical analysis of 
historically observed data, it is important to note 
that different runs of matching analysis may lead to 
varying results due to the specific timeframes and 
variables defined in different studies. In the present 
study, the deforestation rates estimated for inside 
and outside indigenous forestlands in Brazilian 
Amazon forests are lower than the deforestation 
rate used in Gray et al. (2015),21 a precursor to the 
present report that was based on the deforestation 
rates estimated by Nepstad et al. (2006). There has 
been an overall declining trend in deforestation 
in Brazil (as well as Bolivia and Colombia) over 
the past two decades, therefore the annual defor-
estation rates estimated in the present matching 
analysis, using more updated data, are lower than 
the ones estimated in Nepstad et al. (2006). That 
study reported that, between 1997 and 2000, the 
annual deforestation rate in Brazil was 1.45 percent 
outside indigenous lands and 0.17 percent inside 
indigenous forestlands. 
4.2.2 The Benefits of Global Carbon  
Sequestration Services 
The Amazon forests contain one-tenth of the 
global carbon stored in land ecosystems (86±17 
Pg of carbon) (Saatchi et al. 2011), and account 
for one-tenth of global net primary production, 
sequestering 0.49±0.18 Pg of carbon in an aver-
age climatic year (Phillips et al. 2008). Securing 
indigenous and community forestland tenure can 
reduce deforestation rates and the incidence of fire, 
avoid transforming forests from carbon sinks to 
carbon sources, and contribute to global CO2 miti-
gation efforts. These carbon benefits make securing 
indigenous forestland tenure an effective carbon-
mitigation and climate-regulation tool. 
When the annual deforestation rates inside tenure-
secure indigenous forestlands in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia are determined by matching analysis, the 
total avoided deforested areas can then be calcu-
lated to determine the total carbon stored in these 
forests. A common deforestation rate is assumed for 
all indigenous forestlands in one country, but the 
carbon density (i.e., total carbon stored per hectare 
of forestland) will differ depending on the type of 
Amazon biome and its current status (i.e., intact, 
partially deforested, or deforested). Along with the 
size of that biome held by Indigenous Peoples, these 
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factors determine the total avoided CO2 emissions 
that can be stored by each biome. Finally, the 
estimated avoided CO2 emissions from different 
Amazon biomes are summed to calculate the total 
carbon sequestered by total avoided deforested 
forestlands that are held securely by Indigenous 
Peoples in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. This 
approach yields a smaller quantity of total carbon 
saved from avoided deforestation in Brazilian 
indigenous forestlands than that reported by Gray 
et al. (2015), because the latter applied one average 
carbon density to the entire forest area included in 
the analysis. 
Finally, to monetize these carbon benefits—the 
avoided damages from the avoided deforestation in 
tenure-secure indigenous forestlands—various esti-
mates of the social cost of carbon (SCC) are used. 
The SCC is an estimate of the economic damages 
associated with an incremental increase in carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year. More infor-
mation on these methods is presented below.
1. ESTIMATING THE TOTAL CARBON STORAGE IN THE 
AMAZON BASIN INDIGENOUS FORESTLANDS
The estimation of the total carbon stored through 
avoided deforestation is based on the difference in 
carbon-stock values (including both the above- and 
below-ground biomass content in a given forest 
biome) between intact forest and partially defor-
ested or totally deforested areas (i.e., a carbon-
storage difference). Depending on whether forests 
are partially deforested or deforested, a range of 
carbon-storage gaps can be calculated for the differ-
ent Amazon biomes. Using publicly available data 
sourced from the respective government of each 
country, the total area of indigenous forestlands 
within specific Amazon biomes is calculated, as well 
as the corresponding upper- and lower-bound esti-
mates of the carbon differences (see Table 4). More 
specifically, the lower-bound carbon gap refers 
to the difference between carbon stocks in intact 
forests and in partially deforested forests. This is 
the minimum amount of stored carbon that may be 
released to the atmosphere if a given area of intact 
forests is partially deforested. The upper-bound 
carbon gaps refer to the difference between car-
bon stocks in intact forests and completely defor-
ested lands. This is the maximum amount of stored 
carbon that may be released to the atmosphere if 
a given area of intact forests is completely defor-
ested. Therefore, the carbon sequestration benefits 
are equivalent to damages avoided by preventing 
CO2 emissions release from either partially or fully 
deforested indigenous forestlands.  
To calculate the total reduced CO2 emissions 
through avoided deforestation on all relevant 
Amazon biomes, the per-hectare carbon-storage 
values (presented in Table 4) were converted to 
the equivalent CO2 emissions, using a conversion 
factor of 3.677,22 and then multiplied by the area 
of annually avoided deforestation by biome under 
indigenous forestland management. The avoided 
deforestation is calculated based on the difference 
between deforestation rates within and outside 
indigenous forestlands (estimated through the 
matching analysis previously discussed). 
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2. CHOOSING SOCIAL COSTS OF CARBON AS THE 
UNIT PRICE OF CARBON 
To understand the broader societal economic gains 
related to tenure-secure indigenous forestlands, the 
economic value of carbon storage resulting from 
avoided deforestation is estimated by multiplying 
the annual carbon-stock values by an estimate of 
the social cost of carbon (SCC), which internalizes 
global externalities caused by CO2 emissions. 
The SCC, calculated based on a global damage 
function, is an estimate of the monetized damages 
associated with an incremental increase in carbon 
emissions in a given year. It can be interpreted 
as the value of avoided climate damages at the 
margin—the marginal benefit to society associ-
ated with 1 tonne CO2 emissions reduction (Ding 
2011; Pearce 2003). The damage calculus includes 
(but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural 
productivity, human health, property values given 
increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem 
services that result from climate change. Using SCC 
to calculate carbon benefits allows the calculation of 
total economic benefits (or avoided global dam-
ages) to be based only on the quantity of total CO2 
emissions reduced by a variety of carbon-mitigation 
technologies (including ecosystem-based meth-
ods), regardless of their respective implementation 
costs.23 It can help with understanding the potential 
global carbon benefits (or avoided global damages 
of climate change) attributable to tenure security of 
the indigenous forestlands in the Amazon basin.
The U.S. Government’s latest estimate of the global 
social cost of carbon (SCC) of $41/tCO2 (estimated 
at a 3 percent discount rate and adjusted to 2015 
US$) (U.S. Government 2015) was used for this 
research (Table 5). This is the most comprehensive 
recent assessment available. To represent the 
higher-than-expected economic impacts from 
Table 4  |   Estimated Area of Indigenous Forestlands and Carbon-Storage Difference for the  
Amazon Basin of Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
COUNTRY AMAZON BIOMES
TOTAL AREA OF 
INDIGENOUS 
LANDS (‘000 HA)
AVERAGE CARBON GAP (MG C/HA)
Lower bound* Upper bound**
Bolivia Tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf forests 7,133 69 114
Tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf forests 1,773 88 104
Tropical and subtropical grasslands, savanna, and shrublands 1,720 87 106
Montane grasslands and shrublands 338 44 80
Brazil Tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf forests 97,632 86 120
Tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf forests 670 83 101
Tropical and subtropical grasslands, savanna, and shrublands 12,907 113 127
Flooded grasslands and savannas 30 15 30
Colombia Tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf forests 26,004 64 98
Tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf forests 0.21 131 162
Tropical and subtropical grasslands, savanna, shrublands 727 79 101
Montane grasslands and shrublands 3 17 30
*Lower-bound estimate assumes the carbon gap between intact and partially deforested area
**Upper-bound estimate assumes the carbon gap between intact and deforested area 
Source: Estimated at WRI using geospatial analysis and the following datasets (see References for full citations): INCODER (2015) (Colombia); INRA (2012) (Bolivia); FUNAI 
(2014) (Brazil); Olson et al. (2001) (biomes).
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climate change further out in the tails of the SCC 
distribution, the interagency working group also 
reported an upper-bound value estimate of $121/
tCO2 emissions in the year 2015 (2015 US$), 
which is applied in this research as part of the 
sensitivity analysis to understand the robustness 
of the benefit-cost analysis results. In addition, a 
carbon-market price of $6/tCO2 is used as a lower-
bound estimate to complete the sensitivity analysis. 
While the interagency report shows an increasing 
SCC value through 2050, to reflect the expected 
increasing costs of climate damage, the SCC value is 
held constant over time in the present report to be 
more conservative. 
In addition to global carbon benefits, multiple 
local and regional benefits arise from indigenous 
forestlands in the Amazon basin. These benefits  
are essential to local livelihoods, but are mostly 
public in nature and cannot be sold in the market. 
The difficulty of measuring and accounting for  
these benefits causes them to be largely overlooked 
by policymakers. 
4.2.3 Other Ecosystem-Service Benefits of Tenure-
Secure Indigenous Forestlands in the Amazon Basin
Economists distinguish between use and non-use 
values of ecosystem services. These values are 
essential for local livelihoods, but may or may not 
contribute directly to local income generation.
Use values are values directly related to the use of 
ecosystem services by humans. There are three types 
of use values, including: direct use values that arise 
from direct interaction with ecosystems (e.g., extrac-
tive resource use); indirect use values that are associ-
ated with services provided by resources, but without 
direct use (e.g., carbon sequestration); and option 
values, which are goods or services of potential value 
that are held in reserve for future consumption. 
Non-use values are values that are not related to the 
current or future uses of an ecosystem service, but 
are derived from the knowledge that an ecosystem 
exists and is maintained. Non-use values can be 
further divided into existence value, bequest value, 
and altruistic value. Existence value is the satisfac-
tion derived from the knowledge that ecosystems 
exist and will continue to exist, regardless of 
whether or not they have any use value. Bequest 
value is the satisfaction derived from ensuring that 
ecosystems will be passed on to future generations 
to use and enjoy. Altruistic value is the satisfaction 
derived from ensuring that ecosystems are available 
to other people in the current generation. 
Table 5  |   Estimated carbon Storage Benefits from 
Avoided Deforestation on Indigenous 
forestlands (US$/ha/yr, estimated with 
SCC=$41/tCO2)
COUNTRIES AVERAGE LOWER BOUND
UPPER 
BOUND
Bolivia 40 32 48
Brazil 14 12 16
Colombia 6 5 7
Note: Lower-bound estimates the carbon storage benefits obtained from 
protecting partially deforested area. 
Upper-bound estimates the carbon storage benefits obtained from protecting 
completely deforested area.
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The valuation of some use values is relatively 
straightforward because many ecosystem services 
are sold directly in the market place. Some others, 
like non-use values, cannot be measured or valued 
directly. Examples include ecosystem supporting 
services and some regulating services, such as water 
retention and soil-erosion regulation services pro-
vided by forest ecosystems. When it is not possible 
to account for important ecosystem-service bene-
fits, there is a risk of underestimating the true value 
of forest ecosystems that should be internalized 
when developing cost-efficient forest conservation 
policies. To reveal these non-market values, econo-
mists tend to use production function methods to 
value the related outputs of a biophysical produc-
tion process that have market value. Alternatively, 
they use stated- and revealed-preference methods 
to value ecosystem services (e.g., biodiversity) in 
surrogate markets. The former method is built upon 
biophysical models and the latter often involves 
surveys at the site level to assess people’s willing-
ness to pay for some specific ecosystem service. The 
valuation of even a few essential ecosystem services 
in the forestland for the entire Amazon basin across 
three countries can be extremely demanding on 
time and resources. 
For this reason, valuation of these ecosystem 
services relies mainly on the findings reported in 
the literature. Table 6 presents a summary of the 
value ranges of ecosystem-service benefits (see 
Box 4 for more details) of Amazon forests, derived 
from a review of various peer-reviewed and grey 
literature. These values are presented in the form 
of per-hectare values covering the average, lower- 
and upper-bound estimates that were found for the 
Amazon forests in the literature.
In the present study, the average per-hectare values 
of ecosystem services are used to assess the aver-
age regional and local non-carbon benefits (mostly 
non-market values) that can be generated from the 
avoided deforestation in the indigenous forestlands. 
Using the range of value estimates can also account 
for the uncertainty around different valuation 
methodologies and research scopes used for assess-
ing these numbers (Box 5). 
Unlike the carbon sequestration assessment, value 
estimates reported in this section are averaged of 
different ecosystem services for the Amazon forests 
as a whole. Hence, they can be used only as support-
ing material in relevant international policy debates, 
not for site-specific policy decision-making.24
Table 6  |  Value Ranges of Local Ecosystem-Service Benefits from the Amazon Forest (US$/ha/yr)
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AVERAGE LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
Hydrological services 287 175 400
Nutrient retention 150 100 200
Regulation of local climate dynamics and water cycling 113 55 170
Pollination 45 40 50
Existence value 15 5 25
Recreation and tourism 5 3 7
Source: van Beukering (2015) Table 5.1, based on Verweij et al. (2009)
Note: US$ in 2015 US$
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1. HYDROLOGICAL SERVICES AND NUTRIENT RETENTION
Forest ecosystems provide hydrological services such as regulation of runoff, sediment control, and regulation of flooding 
that ultimately contribute to erosion control (Bonnel and Bruijnzeel 2005; Bruijnzeel 2004; Verweij et al. 2009). The estimated 
cost of on-site soil erosion in the Amazon basin is $68/ha/yr, but downstream or off-site costs are difficult to estimate. Torras 
(2000) applied a ratio of 2:5 to obtain $170/ha/yr. As a result, the total value of on-site and off-site soil erosion prevention is 
estimated at $238/ha/yr. Furthermore, the presence of flooding implies a loss of nutrients. Using a replacement-cost method, 
Uhl et al. (1993) estimated the value of nutrients removed by forest clearance at $3,480/ha, based on the market prices of 
nitrogen/phosphorus/potassium (NPK) fertilizers. Such economic losses can be avoided if deforestation is effectively prevented, 
but it should also be noted that the type of land use that follows deforestation influences the quality of such estimates.
2. REGULATION OF REGIONAL CLIMATE DYNAMICS AND WATER CYCLING
Deforestation can influence global warming through its carbon impact. In turn, the effect of atmospheric warming and 
a decrease in evapotranspiration can weaken moisture cycling and deep convection in the atmosphere over the Amazon 
basin (Verweij et al. 2009). As the world’s largest tropical forest (5.4 million km2), the Amazon forest plays a central role 
in maintaining the global carbon balance and regional climate regimes; its forests cool the air by pumping about 7 trillion 
tonnes of water per year into the atmosphere via evapotranspiration (Moutinho and Schwartzman 2005). In essence, the forest 
functions as a giant air conditioner that keeps the regional climate humid and rainy by cycling atmospheric water in the form 
of aerial rivers to the southeast and center of the South American continent (Fearnside 2003b). Fearnside (1997) estimated 
the value of water cycling at $19/ha/yr by estimating the economic damage to Brazilian agriculture outside the Amazon basin 
per hectare of forest loss. Andersen (1997) estimated the Net Present Value of water cycling at $1,000–3,000, based on 
productivity loss.
3. POLLINATION 
Reduced deforestation can also bring other important ecosystem-service benefits, such as pollination services. Coffee, for 
example, is grown in the Amazon basin, albeit not on a large scale. Evidence has shown that deforestation can cause a direct 
reduction of coffee yields of up to 18 to 20 percent and a decline of net revenues per hectare of up to 14 percent over a period 
of two decades (Olschewski et al. 2006). Based on the potential damages to yield, Olschewski et al. (2006) calculated that, for a 
plantation in southern Manabí in Ecuador, the value of pollination averages $49/ha (2006). 
4. EXISTENCE VALUE 
Only a few studies venture to monetize the existence value of the Amazon forest by assessing people’s willingness-to-pay for 
protecting it. Pearce (1991) estimated a range of existence values of $10–16/ha/yr. Horton et al. (2003) evaluated willingness-
to-pay of Italian and British citizens for the implementation of a proposed program of protected areas in the Brazilian Amazon 
basin. Households of both countries were willing to pay on average $45.60/yr to protect 5 percent of the Brazilian Amazon, and 
$59.28/yr to protect 20 percent. 
5. RECREATION AND TOURISM 
Tourism is one of the largest industries and employers in the world. It currently accounts for 10.7 percent of the world’s 
gross domestic product (GDP), and employs 260 million people (Verweij et al. 2009). In some places, forest visits have 
become a major tourist attraction. Based on the principle that biodiversity must pay for itself by generating economic benefits, 
community-based ecotourism has become a popular tool for biodiversity conservation (Kiss 2004). One method of calculating 
the tourism value is to take the gross revenues from visitors to the Amazon and translate these into per-hectare values.
BOX 4  |   UNDERSTANDING THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM-SERVICE  
BENEFITS REPORTED IN TABLE 6
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1. NON-CARBON ECOSYSTEM-SERVICES VALUATION
The valuation of ecosystem services is challenged by data constraints in the reported study areas. Many marketed forest 
ecosystem-services generate different economic returns in different countries, depending on the market prices and labor 
costs. The values of some non-marketed ecosystem services are estimated based on preferential or willingness-to-pay data, 
which again may vary significantly across regions depending on the socio-economic characteristics of the study area. Relevant 
studies in the literature have either a narrow focus on some specific marketed forest products, or have a broad scope covering 
many ecosystem services provided by the Amazon forest as a whole. New original valuation studies for specific indigenous 
forestlands are needed, or more detailed meta-analysis (based on the benefit transfer method) can be used to transfer the value 
estimates obtained by original valuation studies at the policy sites to the study sites of interest. In the latter case, site-specific 
data to help identify local preferences (e.g., gross domestic product and population) would be required. 
2. COLLECTIVE-ACTION AND CONFLICT-RESOLUTION BENEFITS VALUATION
These benefits are often difficult to quantify because they necessitate an understanding of the number of conflicts occurring, 
and the transaction and other costs associated with these conflicts (e.g., number of deaths/injuries, cost of establishing 
conflict-resolution programs or initiatives, and wages for staff who work to address conflicts). Additionally, while Indigenous 
Peoples and other communities may be better able to organize and work with secondary and external stakeholders, it is 
difficult to capture transaction costs that may include, for example, a reduction in the number of meetings or hours spent 
working with communities. Finally, it is difficult to capture forest-production-improvement data that may result from behavioral 
changes following collective action and conflict resolution. These data are often neither collected by relevant stakeholders nor 
disaggregated from government budgetary data in a way that enables a proper interpretation of scale of benefits. As a result, 
collective-action and conflict-resolution benefits are excluded from this research.
3. MATCHING ANALYSIS
This research has at least three limitations. First, matching analysis does not control for unobserved confounding variables 
that could bias results. This issue is especially pertinent in light of the fact that the research used the same covariates for 
each country and therefore is not able to control for idiosyncratic confounding factors in each country. For example, the 
matching analysis does not control for policy interventions such as payments for ecosystem services, technical extension 
for managed forestry, land-use change regulations, and natural resource extraction. If these interventions affect deforestation 
differentially inside and outside tenure-secure indigenous forestlands, they may bias the results. Second, the analysis does not 
take advantage of temporal variation in the securing of indigenous forestlands and in forest loss to help to identify its effect. 
Finally, the outcome data—the Hansen et al. (2013) forest loss data—have limitations in that they measure only deforestation. 
Forest degradation resulting from selective logging and other forms of disturbance may be at least as important a cause of 
environmental damage and carbon emissions in some parts of the Amazon basin. In addition, while the deforestation data used 
have significant strengths, they also have limitations including the fact that they do not differentiate between natural and other 
types of forests and agroforests (Burivalova et al. 2015; Tropek et al. 2014). 
BOX 5  |   CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF COLLECTING AND ANALYZING BENEFIT DATA
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SECTION V
ECONOMIC COSTS 
OF TENURE-SECURE 
INDIGENOUS 
FORESTLANDS
International organizations play an essential role in financing and 
supporting the land regularization and titling process in many 
Amazon basin countries. While there are some differences across 
countries, after initial and often relatively high up-front costs, 
maintenance costs can be quite low for governments due to the 
monitoring efforts of Indigenous Peoples and their organizations 
(e.g., Xingu Indigenous Land Associations).
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5.1 Overview of Cost Categories 
Processes for establishing and maintaining tenure 
vary within and across countries, depending on 
governmental infrastructure, institutional capacity, 
land management, and ownership regimes, among 
other factors. Furthermore, land tenure may com-
prise different bundles of rights and therefore the 
processes for establishing and maintaining those 
rights may vary (Robinson et al. 2014). Despite 
these variations, four general categories of costs 
defined by Gray et al. (2015) are recognized:
 ▪ Tenure-security establishment costs: 
Costs associated with establishing or changing 
the institutional and legislative framework to 
secure indigenous forestlands tenure. Costs in-
clude investment and transaction costs associ-
ated with legislative or regulatory changes.
 ▪ Indigenous-forestlands establishment 
costs: Upfront or initial investment and trans-
action costs for identifying and securing lands 
as indigenous forestlands; including identifi-
cation, demarcation, registration, titling, and 
management-plan establishment costs. 
 ▪ Indigenous-forestlands management, 
operating, and monitoring costs: Annual 
or recurring costs associated with protecting 
indigenous forestlands tenure; monitoring 
and enforcement activities on these lands to 
ensure that rights are protected; transaction 
costs associated with handling disputes over 
indigenous forestlands; and recurring invest-
ments in programs or activities to support and 
strengthen indigenous rights and livelihoods on 
these lands. 
 ▪ Opportunity costs: Foregone income from 
alternative land use that Indigenous Peoples 
and other parties would have received if the 
indigenous forestlands had been converted to 
another highest-value alternative land use, such 
as agriculture or cattle pastures. 
Tenure-security establishment costs; indigenous-
forestland establishment costs; and indigenous-
forestland management, operating, and monitoring 
costs are actual expenses incurred at different 
stages of land-tenure reform and may be incurred 
by a variety of actors. 
These actors include Indigenous Peoples, that is, 
those who directly experience the impacts of forest-
tenure policy changes. In particular, Indigenous 
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Peoples incur investment and transaction costs 
associated with working with local and federal gov-
ernment agencies to establish and maintain tenure, 
as well as costs from monitoring and managing 
their land, and defending it from loggers, ranchers, 
and other intruders (Nepstad et al. 2006). Other 
actors include local and federal government agen-
cies, natural-resource managers, and others who 
can make and shape decisions that provide financial 
and technical support to Indigenous Peoples to 
help secure and guarantee their rights (Borger et al. 
2015). Finally, actors include people with the power 
to influence decisions, including the bilateral and 
multilateral development organizations that sup-
port government agencies, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) (Waite et al. 2014).
International organizations have played an essen-
tial role in financing and supporting the land-
tenure regularization and titling process in many 
Amazon basin countries. Therefore, budgetary data 
published by these organizations have served as an 
important source of cost data for the benefit-cost 
analysis presented in this study. Moreover, detailed 
cost components vary depending on the status 
and size of the land, the efficiency of existing land 
administration systems, and the legal framework 
and institutional structures that facilitate the land 
regularization and titling process of the country. 
Table 7 summarizes a list of cost components that 
have been observed in association with land-tenure 
security establishment in Amazon basin countries 
in general, and in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
in particular. Opportunity costs, which represent 
the highest values of alternative land uses, are an 
indicator of deforestation pressures (e.g., urban 
development, agriculture, and cattle pastures). 
Opportunity costs reflect threats to forest conser-
vation in many developing countries, and these 
threats have led to land conversion and deforesta-
tion in the Amazon basin. However, in the present 
study, opportunity costs are excluded from the 
benefit-cost analysis. Indigenous land titles specify 
that the lands be used for traditional subsistence 
uses (see Section 3). Commercial use of forest 
products and conversion of forestlands to other 
uses would require government approval. Most 
Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
have sought to maintain their forests and have not 
requested government approval to convert their 
land to other uses. Amazon basin governments have 
also expressed reluctance to authorize Indigenous 
Peoples to convert their forestlands to agriculture 
or other uses. Thus, if the land laws are adhered to, 
the opportunity costs of conversion are equal  
to zero. 
Table 7  |  Costs Associated with Tenure Security of Indigenous Forestlands in the Amazon Basin
COST CATEGORY COST COMPONENTS STAKEHOLDERS WHO  MAY INCUR COSTS
Tenure-security 
establishment costs
 ▪ Constitutional reforms ▪ Governmental decrees ▪ Law reforms and implementation
National government,
international organizations
Indigenous-forestland 
establishment costs
 ▪ Establishment of supporting agencies and system upgrade ▪ Delimitation and approval ▪ Declaration of indigenous lands  ▪ Demarcation ▪ Technical evaluation and registration
International organizations, national 
and local government agencies, 
Indigenous Peoples
                        
Indigenous forestland 
management, operating, 
and monitoring costs
 ▪ Development of forest management plans ▪ Ongoing management and monitoring of land titling process ▪ Management and regulation for land regulation and cadaster ▪ Consolidation and technical support for capacity building ▪ Compensation for relocation
International organizations, national 
and local government agencies, 
NGOs, Indigenous Peoples
Opportunity costs Foregone income from soybean production, cattle pastures, roads, 
commercial timber, and/or urban development 
Landholders 
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While this applies to titled indigenous land in the 
three countries studied for this report, it does not 
apply to other lands. Outside of protected indig-
enous lands, landowners may have incentives to 
convert forestlands at agricultural frontiers to 
maximize their land rents and financial returns, for 
example by converting to production of high-value 
Table 8  |   Opportunity Costs Arising from 
Indigenous Forestlands in the Amazon 
Basin (US$/ha/yr)
AVERAGE LOWER BOUND
UPPER 
BOUND
Cropland  
(i.e. soy beans)
450 300 600
Pasture 78 40 115
Timber 25 17 33
Source: van Beukering et al. (2015): Table 5.1
Most Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
have sought to maintain their forests and have not requested 
government approval to convert their land to other uses. 
Amazon basin governments have also expressed reluctance to 
authorize Indigenous Peoples to convert their forestlands to 
agriculture or other uses. Thus, if the land laws are adhered 
to, the opportunity costs of conversion are equal to zero. 
agricultural commodities such as meat, vegetable 
oils, and sugar. Some of the observed driving forces 
of deforestation in these cases include govern-
ment programs that provide incentives for frontier 
expansion, infrastructure improvement and expan-
sion, land speculation in the absence of land titling 
and governance, logging, and increasing demand 
for biofuels and food (May et al. 2013). Studies 
show that, in the Amazon basin, average values of 
alternative land uses are often high and cannot be 
neglected (Table 8). 
5.2 Costs of Indigenous-Forestland 
Tenure Security in Bolivia, Brazil,  
and Colombia 
Cost data were collected primarily from govern-
ment and other stakeholder websites, publicly 
available data on land regulatory programs financed 
by international organizations, peer-reviewed and 
grey literature, and solicitation of data from local 
researchers and country experts (where data were 
not available online) (see Appendix 3 for more 
budget data for all countries). 
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BOLIVIA
At the time of this research, it was not possible to 
obtain budgetary data from the national agency in 
Bolivia that is responsible for land regularization 
and titling. Therefore, the costs were estimated 
using data from international funders. Data on 
the costs of tenure-security establishment were 
obtained mainly from international development 
agencies (e.g., World Bank (WB), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), European Union, and 
International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD)), together with some national agencies (e.g., 
Danish International Development Agency (DAN-
IDA), U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), and Netherlands Development Coopera-
tion). International financing to support indigenous 
lands has generally been concentrated in two  
periods: 1996–2002, and 2003–2012. Although 
Bolivia’s reforms of indigenous land rights have 
occurred within the broader context of the nation’s 
history of agrarian reform, the government only 
began to recognize indigenous land claims in a 
significant manner following enactment of the 
1994 Constitution. In 1996, the National Agrarian 
Reform Institute law was passed, which recognized 
Indigenous Peoples’ traditional lands and called for 
land titles to be issued. Since 1996, both the WB 
and IDB have provided loans to support constitu-
tional and legal reforms, and help the government 
strengthen its capacity to process land registration, 
titling, and management systems, which are catego-
rized as tenure-security establishment costs. Other 
organizations such as USAID and DANIDA have 
provided a significant amount of the financial and 
technical support to help with land titling and regu-
larization through projects on the ground. These 
budgets are categorized under indigenous-forest-
land establishment costs and other costs related to 
management, operations, and monitoring. 
BRAZIL
To estimate indigenous-forestland establishment costs 
and indigenous-forestland management, operating, 
and monitoring costs, researchers from the University 
of São Paulo collected federal and local government 
budgetary data. The researchers indicated that this 
estimate provides a general approximation of costs. 
As the Fundação Nacional do Índio (FUNAI) is the 
official indigenous agency of Brazil, costs are based 
on the average annual FUNAI budget for working 
with and managing indigenous lands from 2005 to 
2014. These costs are broken out into three categories: 
ethnic identity/cultural heritage expenses, adminis-
trative expenses, and protection/land-management 
expenses. FUNAI’s annual budget for working with 
and managing indigenous lands is available at the 
government online platform Transparência Pública 
(CGU/ Transparência Pública 2015). Additionally, 
local government expenditures for indigenous lands 
were included in indigenous-forestland establishment 
and indigenous-forestland management, operating, 
and monitoring costs, based on the average expen-
diture from 2005 to 2014 (FINBRA 2015). The costs 
do not include tenure-establishment costs such as 
constitutional reforms and government decrees.
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COLOMBIA
Two main sources of budgetary data were used for 
estimating the costs of establishing tenure security 
and indigenous forestlands in Colombia. The first 
is the Natural Resources Management Program 
(NRMP), which has been implemented by the 
Colombian Ministry of Environment and supported 
by the World Bank since 1994. As part of the Policy 
and Strategy Development aspect of NRMP, three 
components deal with: titling and demarcating 
indigenous reserves (Resguardo Indigena), titling 
Afro-Colombian community lands, and setting up 
a series of Regional Committees. These compo-
nents ensure the active participation of Indigenous 
Peoples and Afro-Colombian communities and 
their organizations in the land titling, environmen-
tal monitoring, and natural resources management 
activities financed under the program. These data 
were used to assess the costs related to tenure-
security establishment in Colombia. The second 
source of data is the average land titling costs of 
each Resguardo Indigena provided by the Instituto 
Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural (INCODER). 
These data were used to estimate the costs of 
indigenous-forestland establishment, management, 
operations, and monitoring.
Figure 4 presents the estimated annual costs related 
to tenure-security establishment of indigenous for-
estlands in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. The costs 
estimated for Brazil, in particular the management, 
operating, and monitoring costs, may be lower than 
the costs in Bolivia and Colombia because many 
Indigenous Peoples in Brazil monitor and patrol 
their own lands. After initial and relatively high 
up-front costs, maintenance costs can be quite low 
for government due to the efforts of Indigenous 
Peoples, and their indigenous organizations (e.g., 
Xingu Indigenous Land Associations). 
Some of the challenges presented by cost-data  
collection are outlined in Box 6.
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Costs of Securing Indigenous Forestland 
Tenure in the Amazon Basin
(2015 US$)
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Figure 4  |   Costs of Securing Indigenous 
Forestland Tenure in the Amazon 
Basin (2015 USD)
Sources: Authors’ estimate based on: (1) World Bank (2006); IDB (2003, 2012); 
USAID (2011); (2) CGU/Transparencia Publica (2015); FINBRA (2015); (3) 
INCODER (2015); World Bank (2001)
In the present economic analysis, it is not possible 
to capture all costs of tenure-secure indigenous 
forestlands because of the following data limitations 
and knowledge gaps: 
TENURE-SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT COSTS
Valuing the costs associated with establishing 
tenure security (via policy and institutional changes) 
necessitates an understanding of the transaction 
costs associated with these changes, including, for 
example, staff time spent drafting tenure reforms and 
working with Indigenous Peoples. For Bolivia and 
Colombia, tenure-security and indigenous-forestland 
establishment, management, and monitoring costs 
could be approximated based on estimates of foreign 
and domestic expenditures to support the land 
administration reform, and regularization and titling 
of indigenous lands. For Brazil, however, the available 
data are not clear on the financing that supported the 
constitutional reform of 1988 and other government 
decrees and policy changes.
UNCERTAINTY REGARDING COST DATA
Cost data are often not disaggregated by stakeholders 
in ways that permit easy estimation of individual 
cost components associated with securing and 
maintaining tenure security. In Brazil, for example, 
government cost data were not available by cost 
component (e.g., demarcation vs. registration vs. 
titling) or by indigenous land. Rather, annual federal 
and local government budgetary data for indigenous 
lands were available for broad categories. In Bolivia 
and Colombia, it is clear that a significant amount of 
foreign aid, combined with domestic financial support 
and technical and financial assistance from NGOs 
went into promoting land and regularization reform 
and establishing the legal administration system and 
indigenous lands. However, a detailed registry of these 
costs is not available, making it difficult to discern 
the exact investment total and the percentage of costs 
that went to tenure-security establishment, and to 
indigenous-forestland establishment, management, 
operations, and monitoring. 
BOX 6  |   CHALLENGES OF  
COST-DATA COLLECTION 
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SECTION VI
COMPARING THE 
BENEFITS AND 
COSTS OF TENURE-
SECURE INDIGENOUS 
FORESTLANDS
If the indigenous forestlands in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia were 
to be held in a secure manner for the next 20 years, they would 
generate significant local and global ecosystem-service benefits, 
including $21–30 billion in carbon benefits through the avoided 
annual release of 42.8–59.7Mt CO2 emissions. The costs of 
securing the indigenous forestlands are low, accounting to at most 
1 percent of the total benefits derived.
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6.1 Understanding  
Benefit-Cost Analysis  
Benefit-cost analysis is an economic decision-
making approach, consisting of a set of procedures 
for defining and comparing the full benefits and 
costs of a given action (Zerbe and Dively 1994). In 
this report, benefit-cost analysis (Figure 5) is used 
to assess whether the continuous effort of securing 
indigenous forestland tenure in the Amazon basin 
is worth pursuing from an economic perspective. 
It involves comparing the total expected costs of 
establishing and maintaining indigenous-forestland 
security (Section 5) against the total expected 
benefits (Section 4), to see whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Both benefits and costs are 
expressed in monetary terms, and are adjusted 
for the time value of money (2015 US$) so that all 
flows of benefits and costs over time (which tend to 
occur at different points in time) are expressed on a 
common basis in terms of their “present value” (see 
Appendix 4 for technical discussions of benefit-cost 
analysis).
In this study, annual benefits and costs are cal-
culated over a 20-year period and discounted to 
their present value in 2015 using a 6 percent real 
discount rate, which is the average discount rate 
between 2 percent and 10 percent—the rates that 
are most commonly used in forestry studies (Cub-
bage et al. 2013). Box 7 provides the detailed justi-
fications for these choices. The discounted benefits 
and costs are then compared to calculate the net 
present value (NPV). NPV is a common metric for 
comparing benefits and costs because it converts 
benefits and costs into a single value by discount-
ing so that they can be compared in present value 
terms. The results of the NPV can be used to assist 
policy decision-making (Cubbage et al. 2013); a 
positive NPV indicates a gain from investing in 
indigenous-forestland tenure security in the Ama-
zon basin whereas a negative NPV indicates a loss. 
In our analysis, NPV results are presented at both 
per-hectare and aggregated-indigenous-forestland 
scales. Finally, results for 2 and 10 percent discount 
rates are also presented, as part of a sensitivity 
analysis to understand the robustness of the results. 
 
Ecosystem-service benefits
Social benefits
Collective-action and 
conflict-resolution benefits
BENEFITS
Tenure-security 
establishment costs
Indigenous-forestland management, 
operating, and monitoring costs
Opportunity costs
Indigenous-forestland 
establishment costs
COSTS
Figure 5  |  Benefits and Costs of Securing Indigenous Forestlands Tenure in the Amazon Basin
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TIMEFRAME
Land tenure impacts investment, credit availability, poverty rates, land values, and agricultural productivity, are all linked to 
economic performance. Securing indigenous forestland tenure is considered a long-term investment (greater than 10 years) 
by national governments to meet one or more goals; therefore a timeframe that is long enough for calculating the associated 
benefits and costs must be considered. However, despite the constitutional reforms that have taken place in several Amazon 
basin countries, in particular since the 1990s, tenure-security risks still exist. For instance, a large political faction in Brazil 
opposes the expansion of indigenous lands (Vianna 2015), and Brazil’s policy for Indigenous Peoples still has extensive legal, 
institutional, and methodological deficits in terms of how it handles the protection and management of indigenous lands (GIZ 
2015). As a consequence, a 20-year analysis period is used to cover the uncertainty and risks associated with maintaining 
tenure security over the long term. 
DISCOUNT RATE
In order to compare economic effects that occur at different points in time, the practice of applying a discount rate to future 
effects is essential, as the selection of the discount rate (or rates) may greatly alter the NPV and, ultimately, influence 
decision-making. For natural assets such as fisheries and forest, the rate commonly used for most calculations is 4 percent, 
based on an estimate of the social discount rate made in earlier work by Pearce and Ulph (1999). In a more recent study, 
Cubbage et al. (2013), argue that “the appropriate discount rate is a controversial subject, but in principle it should represent 
an individual’s, organization’s, or government’s opportunity cost of capital for an investment. Discount rates commonly vary 
from as little as 2 percent up to 10 percent in forestry literature, but are often as much as 6 percent to 15 percent or more in 
practice.” 
Discount rates measure social or individual preferences for the value attached to future resources. The higher the discount 
rate, the lower will be the discounted present value of the resources in a future point of time. Therefore, low discount rates 
may be considered appropriate for public goods and investments because they place relatively more value on returns for 
future generations. However, obtaining market loans at such low discount rates is often not possible, and many poor people, 
Indigenous Peoples, and other communities may have very high discount rates—they place a much higher premium on 
funds and income in the present than in the future. Thus, the higher discount rates common in the market reflect the cost of 
capital for private goods and services. Because indigenous forestlands secure the collective rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the Amazon basin, these forests resources are not pure public goods in nature. In the present study, a 6 percent discount rate 
is used to reflect the fact that Indigenous Peoples may expect to gain economic returns from their commonly owned forest 
resources sooner rather than later. The results for a 2 and 10 percent discount rate are also examined.
BOX 7  |   THE CHOICE OF TIMEFRAME AND DISCOUNT RATE IN THE PRESENT ANALYSIS
6.2 Results of the Benefit-Cost Analysis
The economic analysis results are presented in the 
form of estimates of the following: 
 ▪ the present value of global carbon-mitigation 
benefits;
 ▪ the present value of local and regional 
ecosystem-service benefits (including 
regulation of regional climate dynamics, 
hydrological services, pollination, nutrient 
retention, and other non-use values);
 ▪ the present value of tenure-security 
establishment and maintenance costs; and 
 ▪ the NPV (i.e., the difference between 
discounted benefits and costs) of  
the investments in securing indigenous 
forestland tenure in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia for a timeframe of 20 years at a  
6 percent discount rate.  
WRI.org        54
The NPVs for Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia are 
positive (Table 9), indicating that the economic 
benefits of the ecosystem services provided by 
tenure-secure indigenous forestlands in these 
countries significantly outweigh the annual per-
hectare costs of securing indigenous-forestland 
tenure. Comparing the total benefits (i.e., the local 
and global benefits combined) against the costs, 
securing indigenous forestland tenure can gener-
ate a net total benefit in Bolivia ranging between 
$4,888/ha and $10,784/ha, a net benefit in Brazil 
ranging between $4,636/ha and $10,402/ha, and a 
net benefit in Colombia ranging between $4,610/ha 
and $10,344/ha, respectively.  
It should be noted that the per-hectare benefits of 
local and regional ecosystem services are estimated 
regional averages from the literature, whereas the 
marginal per-hectare carbon-mitigation benefits 
are estimated differently across countries due to 
the significant variations in deforestation rates 
inside and outside indigenous forestlands. This 
difference may provide additional insights into 
the efficiency of investing in tenure security in 
different regions. For instance, the results indicate 
that securing land tenure on each hectare of 
Table 9  |   Benefit-Cost Analysis Results—The Net Present Value (Period = 20 years,  
Discount rate = 6%, 2015 USD) 
BENEFITS/COSTS/NPV BOLIVIA BRAZIL COLOMBIA
Global Carbon-Mitigation Benefits US$/ha
 Lower-bound estimate  373  144  57 
 Upper-bound estimate  555  196  87 
Local and Regional Ecosystem-Service Benefits US$/ha
 Lower-bound estimate 4,559
 Upper-bound estimate  10,274 
Total Benefits (= Global Carbon-Mitigation Benefits + Local and Regional 
Ecosystem-Service Benefits) 
US$/ha
 Lower-bound estimate 4,933 4,704 4,616
 Upper-bound estimate 10,829 10,470 10,360
Tenure-security Establishment and Maintenance Costs (US$/ha)  45 68 6
The Net Present Value (= Total Benefits – Tenure-security Establishment 
and Maintenance Costs) 
US$/ha
 Lower-bound estimate 4,888 4,636 4,610
 Upper-bound estimate 10,784 10,402 10,344
Note: Costs are likely underestimated due to data constraints regarding tenure-security establishment. Likewise, benefits are also likely underestimated due to data constraints.
The analysis suggests 
that securing each hectare 
of indigenous-forestland 
tenure can generate 
global carbon-mitigation 
benefits and local and 
regional ecosystem service 
benefits that are higher 
than the costs of tenure-
security establishment and 
maintenance costs.
        55Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs
indigenous forestlands for a period of 20 years 
could generate carbon-mitigation benefits of up 
to $555/ha in Bolivia. In Brazil and Colombia, the 
benefits could be lower, amounting to $196/ha 
and $87/ha, respectively. The carbon-mitigation 
benefits in Bolivia are estimated to be higher than 
in the other study countries because deforestation 
rates in the unsecured forestlands are much higher 
than in the secured forestlands (see Table 3), 
suggesting that if all other conditions held constant, 
investing in tenure security on each hectare of 
indigenous forestlands in Bolivia would result 
in greater reductions in deforestation and hence 
higher carbon benefits in terms of reduced carbon 
emissions. 
If the existing indigenous lands in Bolivia 
(10,964,600 ha), Brazil (111,238,600 ha), and 
Colombia (26,752,500 ha) were to be held in a 
secure manner for the next 20 years, they would 
generate positive carbon benefits amounting to 
$21–30 billion, by avoiding the release of 42.8–59.7 
MtCO2 emissions annually from deforestation 
(Table 10). These avoided CO2 emissions are 
equivalent to about 9 percent of Bolivia’s total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (i.e. CO2e includ-
ing land-use change and forestry) in 2012, and up 
to 3 percent of total CO2e emissions from Brazil as 
well as from Colombia in 2012. Overall, avoided 
CO2 emissions achieved by avoided deforestation 
through tenure-secure indigenous forestlands in 
the Amazon basin can contribute to the objectives 
of the three study countries’ Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs).
Regarding the per-unit carbon-mitigation cost ($/
tCO2) of securing indigenous forestland tenure in 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, the results suggest 
that securing tenure in these countries as a climate-
mitigation strategy may be more cost-effective 
than other carbon capture and storage measures. A 
recent report (IEA 2011) estimated the average cost 
of avoided CO2 through carbon capture and storage 
to be about $58/tCO2 (adjusted in 2015 US$) for 
coal-fired power plants, and $85/tCO2 for natural 
gas-fired power plants.25 In contrast, the per-unit 
costs of carbon mitigation ($/tCO2) through avoid-
ing deforestation by securing tenure in indigenous 
forestland are significantly  cheaper, with an 
estimated range of $2.04 to $3.66/tCO2 in Bolivia, 
$8.74 to $11.88/tCO2 in Brazil, and $4.75 to $7.26/
tCO2 in Colombia (Table 10). 
It is important to distinguish between carbon-
mitigation costs incurred through securing indig-
enous forestland tenure, and the carbon price paid 
per unit of carbon stocks saved via the Reduction of 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degrada-
tion (REDD+) program. The former shows only 
that investing in securing indigenous forestland 
tenure is a low-cost option that helps governments 
to create enabling conditions, remove institutional 
barriers, and incentivize forest conservation and 
sustainable management. The latter indicates the 
appropriate level of market incentives required to 
compensate large private owners for the financial 
costs of forest conservation (including avoided for-
estland conversion), taking into account the oppor-
tunity costs that drive deforestation in the area (see 
discussion in Section 5).
Table 10  |   Estimated Costs of Carbon Mitigation through Avoided Deforestation on 
Indigenous Lands (2015 US$)
 COUNTRY COST OF CARBON MITIGATION ($/tCO2)
AVOIDED ANNUAL CO2 EMISSIONS 
(Mt/yr)
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL GHG 
EMISSIONS INCLUDING LAND-USE 
CHANGE AND FORESTRY (%)*
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
Bolivia 2.04 3.66 8.0 12.0 6 9
Brazil 8.74 11.88 31.8 43.2 1.7 2.4
Colombia 4.75 7.26 3.0 4.6 1.5 2.3
*Data on CO
2
e emissions including land-use change and forests were taken from http://cait.wri.org/ for year 2012.
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The variations among mitigation costs across 
countries (Table 10) may indicate where investment 
in indigenous forestland-tenure security is most 
cost-efficient. Economic theory suggests that invest-
ing in the country with the lowest cost of carbon 
mitigation through avoided deforestation is more 
efficient in terms of generating marginal economic 
returns. In this case, investing in a country like 
Bolivia, where land regularization has faced more 
institutional challenges (Stevens et al. 2014) will 
provide more significant returns at the margin, fol-
lowed by Colombia and Brazil. As pressures on land 
increase, securing indigenous forestland tenure will 
likely become politically more difficult and finan-
cially more costly.
In addition to carbon benefits, securing indigenous 
forestland tenure in the Amazon basin will also 
safeguard a multitude of regional and local ecosys-
tem services that benefit Indigenous Peoples, both 
directly and indirectly. Among the total ecosystem-
service benefits valued (including the carbon 
benefits), a significant portion (about 90 percent 
on average) of these benefits are primarily local or 
regional benefits (e.g., hydrological services, nutri-
ent retention, local climate regulation, and pollina-
tion) and often unpriced in the market. 
In sum, the total economic benefits associated with 
securing indigenous forestland tenure for the analy-
sis period could reach between $54.1 and $118.7 
billion in Bolivia, $523.2 billion and $1.2 trillion in 
Brazil, and $123.4 and $277 billion in Colombia. 
These results are likely to be underestimates due to 
the omitted social benefits (Section 4), including job 
creation and avoided social conflicts associated with 
tenure-secure indigenous forestlands.
6.3 Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis 
Given uncertainty and data-collection constraints, 
this study includes lower- and upper-bound value 
estimates of all ecosystem-service benefits (Section 
4). In addition, a two-step sensitivity analysis is 
performed by varying the discount rates and carbon 
prices to test the robustness of the research results: 
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 ▪ First, 2 percent and 10 percent discount 
rates are applied in addition to the 6 percent 
discount rate used in the study to calculate  
the NPV. 
 ▪ Second, a lower and higher carbon price is used 
to assess the robustness of the results:  
 □ The lower carbon price of $6/tCO2 used in 
the sensitivity analysis is the average his-
torical carbon-market price from the 2014 
State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 
Report from Forest Trends (Goldstein and 
Gonzalez 2014).
 □ The higher carbon price of $119/tCO2 used 
in the sensitivity analysis is an estimate  
of the 95th percentile upper-bound SCC  
value recommended by the U.S. 
Interagency study.
The results are presented in Table 11. 
Economic theory 
suggests that 
investing in the 
country with the 
lowest cost of carbon 
mitigation through 
avoided deforestation 
is more efficient in 
terms of generating 
marginal economic 
returns.
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Table 11  |   Sensitivity Analysis of the Benefit-Cost Analysis
COUNTRY NET PRESENT VALUE ($/HA, 2015 US$) COST OF CARBON 
MITIGATION ($/tCO2)At carbon price of $41/tCO2 At carbon price of $6/tCO2 At carbon price of $121/tCO2
Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
CALCULATED AT DISCOUNT RATE OF 6 PERCENT
Bolivia 4,888 10,784 4,568 10,308 5,603 11,848 2.04 3.66 
Brazil 4,636 10,402 4,519 10,234 5,063 10,778 8.74 11.88 
Colombia 4,610 10,344 4,551 10,270 4,709 10,510 4.75 7.26 
CALCULATED AT DISCOUNT RATE OF 2 PERCENT
Bolivia 6,699 14,786 6,264 14,138 7,674 16,235 2.90 4.32 
Brazil 6,359 14,269 6,200 14,038 6,944 14,783 11.99 16.30 
Colombia 6,310 14,190 6,243 14,088 6,243 14,088 6.52 9.95 
CALCULATED AT DISCOUNT RATE OF 10 PERCENT
Bolivia 3,768 8,310 3,520 7,941 4,322 9,135 1.52 2.88 
Brazil 3,571 8,012 3,481 7,883 7,883 8,303 6.73 9.15 
Colombia 3,543 7,968 3,505 7,910 3,505 7,910 3.66 5.59 
The results are robust to these variations and all 
NPVs remain positive and large regardless of the 
discount rates and carbon prices used. It should be 
noted, however, that whereas the estimated NPV 
results are not sensitive to the changes of carbon 
prices from $41/tCO2 to $6/tCO2, the choice of dis-
count rate has a significant impact on the estimated 
NPVs for all countries. In particular, NPVs esti-
mated at a 2 percent discount rate are nearly double 
those estimated at a 10 percent discount rate. This 
suggests that policies designed to secure indigenous 
forestland tenure for long-term benefits—reflected 
in the choice of a lower discount rate—can generate 
a positive and higher NPV. 
6.4 Key Findings and Conclusions of 
the Benefit-Cost Analysis
1. SECURING INDIGENOUS FORESTLAND TENURE IS A 
LOW-COST, HIGH-BENEFIT INVESTMENT. 
If the existing indigenous forestlands in Bolivia, 
Brazil, and Colombia were to be secure for 
the next 20 years, these forests would provide 
significant local and global ecosystem-service 
benefits. More specifically:
 □ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
provide significant global carbon benefits 
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, amount-
ing to $21–30 billion, through the avoided 
annual release of 42.8–59.7Mt CO2 emis-
sions. According to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
equivalencies calculator,26 this amount 
of avoided CO2 emissions is equivalent to 
taking 9–12.6 million passenger vehicles off 
the roads for one year (Figure 6 presents a 
lower bound of the estimate). This suggests 
that securing indigenous forestland tenure 
represents significant potential in terms of 
helping the governments of Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Colombia to meet the climate change 
mitigation objectives stated in their NDCs.
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Figure 6  |   Annually Avoided CO2 Emissions through Indigenous Forestland-Tenure 
Security in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia
8.04 
Mt CO
2
 per year
WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO: 
1,698,318 
Passenger vehicles taken
off the roads for one year
Bolivia 
has the potential to avoid: 
Brazil 
has the potential to avoid: 
Colombia 
has the potential to avoid: 
3.01 
Mt CO
2
 per year
WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO: 
635,813
Passenger vehicles taken
off the roads for one year
31.76 
Mt CO
2
 per year
WHICH IS EQUIVALENT TO: 
6,708,778 
Passenger vehicles taken
off the roads for one year
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 □ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands pro-
vide significant local and regional ecosys-
tem-service benefits to the local commu-
nity, including regulation of local climate 
dynamics and water cycling, hydrological 
services, pollination, nutrient retention, ex-
istence values, and recreation and tourism 
values. This study estimates that benefits 
ranging between $679 billion and 1,530 
billion would result from a 20-year indige-
nous forestland tenure-security investment 
(Figure 7). This translates to per-hectare 
estimated net benefits in the order of 
$4,559–10,274/ha). Challenged by the “free 
good” characteristics of ecosystem service, 
many ecosystem benefits are not (directly) 
valued in the market place, adding ambigu-
ity to the expected returns on investment in 
forest conservation. Identifying, measuring, 
and demonstrating non-market ecosystem-
service benefits is essential if governments 
and business are to make informed deci-
sions about land management and natural 
resource conservation.
 □ Tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
represent low-cost forest conservation in-
vestments for governments (and therefore 
the public). Secure tenure (coupled with 
other incentives), encourages Indigenous 
Peoples to manage their forests sustainably 
and reduces deforestation at low cost to 
government (and therefore the public)—
costs estimated at $45/ha in Bolivia, $68/
ha in Brazil, and $6/ha in Colombia—the 
calculated sum of discounted total costs 
for a 20-year period. This accounts to at 
most 1 percent of the total benefits derived 
from tenure-secure indigenous forestlands 
in the three countries. When total benefits 
(i.e., local and global benefits combined) 
are compared with total costs, securing 
indigenous forestland tenure can generate 
a positive net per-hectare benefit in Bolivia 
ranging between $4,888/ha and $10,784/
ha, a net benefit in Brazil ranging between 
$4,636/ha and $10,402/ha, and a net ben-
efit in Colombia ranging between $4,610/
ha and $10,344/ha. A good understanding 
of the benefits and costs of tenure-secure 
indigenous forestlands will allow policy-
makers to better target their investments.
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Figure 7  |   Benefit-Cost Analysis Results– 
Net Present Values (2015 USD)
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2. SECURING INDIGENOUS FORESTLAND  
TENURE HAS SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR  
COST-EFFECTIVE CARBON MITIGATION. 
From a financial perspective, investing in secur-
ing indigenous forestland tenure represents 
a relatively cost-effective measure for climate 
change mitigation when compared with other 
carbon capture and storage measures. The 
estimated costs of carbon mitigation through 
indigenous forestland tenure-security programs 
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia range from 
$2.04–3.66/tCO2, $8.74–11.88/tCO2, and 
$4.75–7.26/tCO2, respectively (Figure 8). These 
Figure 8  |   Estimated Costs of Carbon Mitigation through Indigenous Forestland-Tenure  
Security and Other Carbon Capture and Storage
costs are significantly lower than the average 
costs of avoided CO2 through carbon capture 
and storage, which are estimated to be about 
$58/tCO2 for coal-fired power plants (5 to 29 
times more expensive than securing indigenous 
forestland tenure) and $85/tCO2 for natural 
gas-fired power plants (7 to 42 times more 
expensive) (IEA 2011). Although conducting a 
cost-competitiveness analysis of different cli-
mate change mitigation measures is beyond the 
scope of this study, the mitigation-cost estimates 
presented here demonstrate the cost-effective-
ness of tenure-secure indigenous forestlands as 
a carbon-mitigation measure.  
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SECTION VII
CHALLENGES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Indigenous lands in the Amazon basin are under increasing threat 
from infrastructure development, extractive resource operations, 
industrial agriculture, and other investments. There is an urgent 
need for governments—with help from their partners—to 
enact laws that provide Indigenous Peoples with sufficient legal 
protections over their land; to map, demarcated, and formally 
register all undocumented indigenous lands; and to make tenure-
secure indigenous forestlands a central component of their national 
climate change mitigation strategy.
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7.1 Challenges to Indigenous Land 
Rights in the Amazon Basin
These research findings make a strong economic 
case for securing indigenous and, more broadly, 
community forestland tenure. It is, therefore, 
troubling that recent developments in Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, and other Amazon basin coun-
tries threaten the tenure security of indigenous 
and other community lands. While the specific 
challenges vary across the Amazon basin, several 
common developments are noteworthy.
7.2 Slowdown in the Legal Recognition 
of Indigenous Land Rights 
In the last few years, there has been a systematic 
slowdown in the formal recognition of indigenous 
lands, including the mapping, demarcation, and 
titling of indigenous lands, in Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, and other Amazon basin countries. 
Several actions have contributed to this slowdown 
including new administrative procedures that do 
not favor indigenous lands and reduced govern-
ment capacity (e.g., limited human and financial 
resources) that prevent administrative procedures 
from being undertaken in a timely manner. Where 
legal advances had been made, there is now strong 
pushback from political and commercial interests. 
In Brazil, a powerful bloc of anti-indigenous politi-
cians with links to the large agri-business, mining, 
and hydro-electric sectors is pushing forward a 
series of proposals that could open up indigenous 
lands to industrial projects. For example, the 
proposed Constitutional Amendment 215 (PEC 215) 
would roll back the demarcation of new indigenous 
lands by passing the authority from the Fundação 
Nacional do Índio (FUNAI), the government’s 
indigenous affairs department, to the legislature. 
If approved, the shift would likely cause significant 
delays in the recognition of indigenous lands and 
many indigenous lands could be reduced in size 
(Quadros 2015; Vianna 2015; RRI and ISA 2014).
In Bolivia, more than 90 percent of the land titles 
held by Indigenous Peoples have been issued 
since President Evo Morales took office in 2005 
but, still, the pace of land titling has fallen short 
of legal requirements and popular expectation. 
In recent years, the government has repeatedly 
stalled on efforts to redistribute land and title 
indigenous lands, rolled back procedural rights and 
environmental obligations, created bureaucratic 
obstacles to the implementation of promised—and 
constitutionally mandated—self-determination 
on indigenous lands, and continued to allocate 
oil concessions on indigenous lands (Achtenberg 
2013; Sturtevant 2015). While Indigenous Peoples 
have the right of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent 
(FPIC), implementation does not always reflect 
their interests or concerns.
In Colombia, there has been progress in titling 
indigenous (and Afro-Colombian community) 
lands, although the process is far from complete. 
In a significant number of cases, the necessary 
technical studies and demarcation have yet to be 
carried out. The country’s five-decade-long conflict 
(Box 8) hampered field efforts and resulted in the 
formal recognition process being understaffed and 
underfunded. Laws that favor indigenous lands 
have not been effectively implemented. Many Indig-
enous Peoples feel abandoned by the government, 
which has not provided them with even basic social 
services, leaving them isolated and at the mercy of 
armed groups and extractive industries operating in 
the region (WOLA 2013).
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7.3 Threats to Indigenous Land Rights
The slowdown in the formal documentation of 
indigenous lands is coupled with government 
efforts to establish the Amazon basin as the new 
economic frontier for Latin America. Indigenous 
lands are threatened by infrastructure develop-
ment, extractive resource operations, industrial 
agriculture, and other investments.
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT. Governments and 
companies are making significant investments in 
infrastructure in the Amazon basin, which will 
have significant and adverse effects on Indigenous 
Peoples and their forestlands. The Iniciativa para 
la Integracíon de la Infraestructura Regional 
Sudamericana (Initiative for Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America, or IIRSA) is the 
signature initiative, with proposals for more than 
500 mega-projects, including hydroelectric dams 
(e.g., Belo Monte and Balbina dams on the Xingu 
River), highways, waterways, ports, and pipelines 
stretching across the Amazon basin. IIRSA will 
link Brazil, the regional powerhouse, to the Pacific 
Ocean and branch out through the Amazon basin to 
connect mines, oil operations, and industrial agri-
culture to power supplies and trade routes (Guest 
2013). If the Colombian peace holds (Box 8), IIRSA 
could extend to the whole of the western Amazon 
basin. Brazil is the key convener of many IIRSA 
projects and its investments have grown exponen-
tially in the last five to seven years. The Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES), which operates much 
like a development bank and trade finance orga-
nization, has participated in the expansion of the 
Brazilian mining industry, as have companies from 
the country’s powerful agro-industrial lobby (Guest 
2013). 
EXTRACTIVE RESOURCE OPERATIONS. The Amazon 
basin has vast reserves of hard minerals, oil, and 
natural gas, many yet untapped, which govern-
ments are increasingly interested in exploiting 
to generate much-needed public revenues. The 
implications for Indigenous Peoples are significant. 
Many governments are overhauling their laws to 
enable extractive resources extraction. For example, 
in Bolivia in May 2015, Supreme Decree 2366 
opened up several protected areas and national 
parks for oil and gas extraction, many of which 
coincide with indigenous lands (Hill D. 2015; 
Hill T.S. 2015).27 The recent decline in oil prices 
has encouraged governments to expand their oil 
frontiers, especially in the western Amazon basin 
that includes parts of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and western Brazil. In Ecuador and Peru, oil 
The Colombian conflict began in the mid-1960s and has involved the government, paramilitary groups, crime syndicates, and 
guerrillas such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC–EP) and National Liberation Army 
(ELN). The Indigenous Peoples of western Colombia (highlands) have been most affected, but fighting has also taken place in 
the Amazon basin. Large areas of the Colombian Amazon basin were occupied by armed groups, especially in the 1980s and 
1990s, endangering and displacing entire communities. Many indigenous people have been arrested and killed, and several 
Indigenous Peoples are at risk of extinction as a result of the five-decade-long conflict (Belazelkoska 2013; Bryan 2011; Garcia 
and Slunge 2015; IWGIA 2015; AI 2015; WOLA 2013). 
Since 2013, the government and FARC had been negotiating (with Norway and Cuba sponsorship) a peace deal with a self-
imposed 23 March 2016 deadline to reach a comprehensive pact (Acosta 2016). Although this date was missed, a ceasefire and 
disarmament accord was reached on 23 June (WOLA 2016) and a final peace deal was reached on 24 August. The accord sets 
out a roadmap for disarming and demobilizing the FARC and foresees a swift process - a full turnover of guerrilla weapons. A 
plebiscite is scheduled for 2 October 2016 in which voters would vote “yes” or “no.”
Even before the accord was reached, conflict had subsided in some areas, including a number of indigenous lands. The peace 
brought much-needed relief, new social services, and other benefits, but it also brought new challenges to Indigenous Peoples 
and their lands. With stability and security, the government is moving ahead with its plans to open the Colombian Amazon basin 
to economic development. New investments are being made in infrastructure and extractive resource operations, including on 
indigenous lands. The peace has coincided with increased deforestation on indigenous lands in post-conflict areas.
BOX 8  |   CONFLICT, PEACE, AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN COLOMBIA
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and gas blocks alone cover more than two-thirds of 
their portion of the Amazon basin, and in Bolivia, 
Colombia, and western Brazil, major exploration 
activities are rapidly increasing (Cregan 2015; 
Finer et al. 2008). Many blocks overlap indigenous 
lands. Unlike the eastern Brazilian Amazon basin, 
the western Amazon forest is still a largely intact 
area where Indigenous Peoples have effectively 
protected and sustainably managed their lands (and 
where many still reside in voluntary isolation). 
AGRICULTURE. Agricultural practices (farming 
and ranching) undertaken by settler families and 
agribusiness also threaten indigenous lands in the 
Amazon basin. Cattle ranching has been the lead-
ing cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon 
basin since the mid-1960s, and has resulted in 
Indigenous Peoples losing their lands. Since 1970, 
91 percent of land deforested in the Brazilian 
Amazon basin has been used for livestock pasture 
(Steinfeld et al. 2006). In many cases, it is less 
expensive for ranchers to clear forest for new pas-
ture than to adopt a pasture management system, 
resulting in a constant push into the forest. Many 
ranchers (along with colonists and other develop-
ers) clear forest for pasture that is unprofitable or 
only marginally profitable as part of a process of 
land speculation (Butler 2012). Clearing the forest 
allows the private landholder to claim the land, in 
the hope that it will be more valuable in the future. 
Today, Brazil is the world’s top exporter of beef, and 
demand is growing rapidly. In August 2014, Russia 
announced a suspension of beef imports from the 
United States, Australia, and the European Union, 
further encouraging production in Brazil (Datu 
2014). Brazil is also a major producer of soybeans—
the second-largest global producer after the United 
States—mostly for livestock feed (Kirby et al. 2006). 
As production expands, farmers are pushing north-
ward into the Amazon basin.28 And industrial-scale 
oil palm operations, especially for biofuel produc-
tion, may soon take over from cattle ranching as the 
biggest threat to the Brazilian Amazon forest and 
indigenous lands (Frayssinet 2013). Agriculture is 
also expanding in other Amazon basin countries. 
In 2013, President Morales of Bolivia presented the 
“2025 Patriotic Agenda,” a national development 
blueprint. It calls for nearly quadrupling the area of 
agricultural production over the next 10 years, from 
3.5 million to 13 million hectares (Sturtevant 2015), 
an expansion that will threaten indigenous lands and 
forests (Boone 2013).
 
7.4 Recommendations
The research findings provide a strong economic 
case for governments, climate change funding 
agencies, civil society organizations, and other 
parties to invest in securing indigenous and com-
munity land rights in Latin America and around the 
world. While significant progress has been made 
in some countries over the last 10 to 30 years to 
formally recognize community lands, more efforts 
are needed to secure the community lands that are 
not documented or protected by government. The 
recently launched Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) and new international agreement to curb 
climate change present opportunities for the world 
to secure indigenous and other community lands 
and achieve positive development and environment 
outcomes.
There is an urgency to securing indigenous and 
other community land rights now. As the threats 
grow, pressures increase and the opportunity costs 
of alternative community land uses rise. Opposition 
to securing indigenous lands, especially from some 
senior lawmakers in local and national govern-
ment, business leaders, large investors, and other 
influential parties is growing in all Amazon basin 
countries and in many other regions of the world. 
As a consequence, it becomes more challenging 
and financially more costly to recognize and protect 
indigenous and community lands.
Based on the findings of the benefit-cost analysis 
and the challenges confronting Indigenous Peoples 
in the Amazon basin, a set of policy recommenda-
tions is proposed to secure indigenous land rights 
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. Given that many 
indigenous and community lands around the world 
are not secure, these recommendations may also 
apply to other countries.
1. SECURE COMMUNITY LAND RIGHTS. Given the 
significant economic benefits of tenure-secure 
indigenous forestlands at the local, national, 
and global levels, governments and their part-
ners should reform their laws and take other 
actions to secure community lands. While many 
actions can help secure community lands, three 
are of particular importance.
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 □ Enact Supportive Laws. The laws in 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia recognize 
indigenous land rights, but do not provide 
Indigenous Peoples with sufficient legal 
protections. Statutory laws that undermine 
community land rights should be repealed 
and replaced by supportive legislation. 
Among other provisions, supportive laws 
recognize customary tenure arrangements, 
establish community authority over land 
matters, and provide communities with 
the right of FPIC over all developments 
that affect their land (e.g., natural 
resource concessions). The laws, enabling 
regulations, and guidelines should also 
provide for simple, streamlined land-
registration procedures that are not costly 
or time-consuming and, therefore, available 
to Indigenous Peoples and communities.
 □ Formally Recognize Community Land. 
While important strides have been taken, 
there remains considerable indigenous 
land in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia that 
is not mapped,29 demarcated, and formally 
registered. Globally, most of the world’s 
community land has not been formally 
recognized and documented. In the study 
countries, there has been a significant 
slowdown in legal recognition brought on 
by recent regulatory reforms and other 
government actions that have resulted in 
administrative hurdles and other obstacles. 
Governments should remove these barriers 
and provide responsible agencies with the 
human and financial resources needed to 
document all indigenous and community 
lands. 
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 □ Protect Community Lands. For Indigenous 
Peoples and other communities to realize 
their legal rights, laws that support 
their lands must be implemented. The 
governments in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia and their partners—civil 
society organizations, companies and 
investors, and development assistance 
agencies—can help protect community 
lands in various ways. Governments 
can use their police powers to monitor 
indigenous and community lands, and 
remove illegal occupants (e.g., settlers and 
loggers). This may involve investing in new 
technologies (e.g., computerized land-
record management information systems 
and unmanned aerial vehicles/drones); 
supporting community organizations to 
better monitor and protect their land; 
building local capacity to effectively manage 
forests; and refraining from allocating 
extractive resource and agricultural 
concessions on community lands. 
2. MAKE TENURE-SECURE COMMUNITY FOREST-
LANDS A CENTRAL CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
STRATEGY. The governments of Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Colombia recognize the role of forests in 
carbon sequestration and committed in their 
NDCs to protect forests, reduce deforestation 
rates, and restore forestlands. The research 
results suggest that avoided CO2 emissions from 
avoided deforestation on tenure-secure indig-
enous forestlands in the Amazon basin can sig-
nificantly contribute to country NDC objectives. 
The NDCs of Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia do 
not make any specific commitments to securing 
indigenous land rights, but the research find-
ings show that indigenous lands have helped 
reduce deforestation rates in all three countries. 
Had the Indigenous Peoples not had secure 
tenure over their lands and forests, the CO2 
emissions of each country would have been 
higher—by up to 9 percent in Bolivia, and 3 
percent in Brazil and Colombia.30 For Brazil, 
this emission difference is equivalent to 25–35 
percent of Belgium’s total national CO2e emis-
sions in 2012. These figures are non-negligible 
and represent an important contribution to the 
avoided emissions (or emissions reductions) of 
each country and the Amazon forest. 
Given these climate benefits, investing in secur-
ing indigenous forestland tenure would be a 
relatively inexpensive action for governments 
to take to help meet the emissions reduction 
objectives put forward in their NDCs. For 
instance, the government of Colombia com-
mitted to reducing emissions by an estimated 
67MtCO2e by 2030 and, with international 
support, by an estimated 100MtCO2e. Secur-
ing indigenous forestland tenure in its region 
of the Amazon basin could avoid the release of 
about 3–4.6MtCO2 emissions into the atmo-
sphere per year (over 20 years), an amount that 
represents over 69 percent of the amount the 
government proposed to reduce. If the rights of 
currently unregistered indigenous forestlands 
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia were to be 
formally documented and protected, the CO2e 
emissions in these countries would be further 
reduced through avoided deforestation. For 
many governments, the preparation of their 
NDC catalyzed and kick-started national-level 
climate mitigation processes. With the NDCs 
The recently 
launched Sustainable 
Development Goals 
(SDGs) and new 
international agreement 
to curb climate change 
present opportunities 
for the world to secure 
indigenous and other 
community lands 
and achieve positive 
development and 
environment outcomes.
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now in place, governments around the world 
have an opportunity to develop and implement 
national action plans that call for documenting 
and protecting all community lands in their 
countries.
3. UTILIZE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS TO 
SUPPORT SECURING COMMUNITY FORESTLAND 
TENURE. Many studies show that tenure-secure 
community forestlands experience low defor-
estation rates. Consistent with the findings in 
The Economic Costs and Benefits of Securing 
Community Forest Tenure (Gray et al. 2015), 
this research shows that tenure-secure indig-
enous forestlands are low-cost, high-benefit 
investments from an economic perspective, and 
are a cost-effective climate change mitigation 
measure. The findings provide the evidence 
needed for governments and their partners to 
increasingly direct their resources to securing 
indigenous and community land rights. The 
funds could support government agencies to 
formally document community lands as well as 
the Indigenous Peoples and communities which 
invest in protecting their forests.
In addition to traditional bilateral and mul-
tilateral support for securing indigenous and 
community land rights, governments should 
also look to the global climate finance architec-
ture. This finance is channeled through various 
multilateral funds, such as the Global Envi-
ronment Facility, Green Climate Fund, Africa 
Climate Change Fund, Climate Investment 
Funds, Special Climate Change Fund, and Stra-
tegic Climate Fund (Nakhooda et al. 2015b). 
Climate finance is also increasingly available 
through bilateral channels such as the Global 
Climate Change Initiative (United States), 
Global Climate Partnership Fund (Germany, 
UK, and Denmark), International Climate Fund 
(UK), International Climate Forest Initiative 
(Norway), and International Climate Initiative 
(Germany). And a growing number of recipi-
ent countries (e.g., Brazil and Indonesia) have 
set up national climate funds that receive and 
disburse funding for mitigation and adaptation.
Some analysts have argued that progress in reduc-
ing deforestation through these climate funds has 
been limited and has contributed to the shuttering 
of the Congo Basin Forest Fund, the Australian 
International Forest Carbon Initiative, and other 
initiatives (Nakhooda et al. 2015a). This research 
suggests that climate funds could, in some cases, 
meet their climate change mitigation and avoided 
deforestation objectives by supporting efforts to 
secure community forestland tenures.
Finally, there is need for further analysis on the 
benefits and costs of securing community forestland 
tenures. For example, additional analysis is  
needed to:
 ▪ Address Data Constraints for More Compre-
hensive Benefit-Cost Analysis. Addressing the 
data constraints identified in this report could 
improve our understanding of the net economic 
gains from tenure-secure community forest-
lands. Investing in improved monitoring and 
evaluation of community forestlands would be 
an important first step. Improved methods for 
valuing ecosystem services and social benefits 
coupled with disaggregated and transparent 
stakeholder budgetary data would help to fill 
some of the data gaps.  
 ▪ Conduct Benefit-Cost Analysis of other Com-
munity Lands. Research attention has focused 
on indigenous forestlands in Central America 
and the Amazon basin countries. It is important 
to assess the economic benefits and costs for 
other community lands in these regions (e.g., 
Quilimbola communities in Brazil) as well as 
community forestlands in other parts of the 
world, especially Africa. 
 ▪ Complementary Economic Analysis on 
Tenure-Secure Community Land. The 
benefit-cost analysis for this report identified 
several questions that need further study. For 
example, additional research is needed on the 
opportunity costs of indigenous lands and the 
cost-effectiveness of community forestlands as 
a climate change mitigation strategy.
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APPENDIX 1 : ROLE OF FORESTS IN 
NEW CLIMATE COMMITMENTS IN 
BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, AND COLOMBIA
Several commitments in the NDCs of Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia 
are relevant to tenure-secure community forestlands and are  
summarized below. 
BOLIVIA. Bolivia’s NDC (Government of Bolivia 2015) promotes 
the concept of “Living Well,” which includes a vision of holistic 
development and people living in harmony with nature. It notes 
that Bolivia has large forest areas (52.5 million ha in 2015) and 
recognizes that forests contribute both to mitigation and adaptation 
to climate change. As such, the government makes a number of 
forestry commitments, including the following: 
 ▪ increase forest areas with integrated and sustainable community 
management approaches to 16.9 million hectares by 2030, from 
3.1 million hectares in 2010;
 ▪ reduce extreme poverty within the population that depends on 
forests to zero by 2030, from approximately 350,000 people in 
2010;
 ▪ increase net forest coverage to more than 54 million hectares by 
2030, from 52.5 million in 2010; and
 ▪ achieve zero illegal deforestation by 2020 and establish systems 
of control and monitoring of deforestation, fires, and forest fires.
Bolivia’s NDC does not specifically mention securing indigenous 
land rights, but it does call for strengthening community-based 
stewardship in forest management and farming systems, and 
increasing community-forestland management sevenfold by 
2030. However, Bolivia’s NDC also calls for actions that could 
threaten indigenous lands. It proposes expanding investments 
in hydro-projects to generate power and increase water storage 
capacity; increasing agricultural production with the participation 
of smallholders and communities; increasing the area of irrigated 
agricultural land; boosting the oil and mining sectors; and 
developing the road, rail, and river integration of the country to 
connect populations and the flow of goods between the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans. 
BRAZIL. Brazil commits in its NDC (Government of Brazil 2015) 
to reduce CO
2
e in 2025 by 37 percent below 2005 levels, and by 43 
percent below 2005 levels in 2030. According to the government, 
Brazil’s current actions against climate change represent one of the 
largest undertakings by any country, having reduced its emissions 
by 41 percent in 2012 in relation to 2005 levels. It states that in the 
period 2004–2012, Brazil’s GDP increased by 32 percent, while 
emissions dropped more than 50 percent, delinking economic 
growth from emissions over the period, while at the same time lifting 
more than 23 million people out of poverty. 
The NDC states that Brazil has also reduced its emissions from 
deforestation, mainly by reducing deforestation rates in the Brazilian 
Amazon basin by 82 percent between 2004 and 2014. This takes 
into account the role of conservation units and indigenous lands 
as forest managed areas. To further reduce the rate of deforesta-
tion, the NDC includes several forestry commitments, including the 
following:
 ▪ strengthen and enforce the implementation of the Forest Code, at 
federal, state, and municipal levels;
 ▪ strengthen policies and measures with a view to achieving zero 
illegal deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon basin by 2030, and 
compensating for CO
2
e emissions from legal suppression of 
vegetation by 2030;
 ▪ restore and reforest 12 million hectares of forests by 2030; and
 ▪ enhance sustainable native forest management systems with a 
view to curbing illegal and unsustainable practices.
Brazil’s NDC does not commit the country to titling additional 
indigenous lands (or quilombos i.e., Afro-descendant communi-
ties). As in the case of Bolivia, Brazil’s NDC calls for developments 
that could threaten indigenous lands. They include a commitment to 
increase the share of sustainable biofuels in the Brazilian energy mix 
to approximately 18 percent by 2030. Notably, Brazil’s NDC does 
not call for expanding hydropower, which has threatened indigenous 
lands.
COLOMBIA. In 2010, Colombia produced estimated GHG emis-
sions of 224 MtCO
2
e, which represents just 0.46 percent of total 
global emissions in 2010. Of this total, 130.36 MtCO
2
e came from 
agriculture, forestry, and other land uses (about 58 percent of the 
total emissions). In its NDC (Government of Colombia 2015), the 
government commits to reducing its CO
2
e emissions by 20 percent 
by 2030 with respect to the projected Business-as-Usual (BAU) 
scenario. This translates to a reduction from 335 MtCO
2
e (BAU) to 
268 MtCO
2
e, a reduction of 67MtCO
2
e. With international support, 
the government would increase its ambition from a 20 percent to a 
30 percent reduction with respect to BAU by 2030—a reduction of 
100.5 MtCO
2
e.
Colombia’s NDC reaffirms its commitment to reduce deforesta-
tion and to preserve important ecosystems, including the Amazon 
basin, given its huge potential to contribute to the stabilization of 
CO
2
e in the atmosphere. Specifically, the government commits to 
protecting 3 million ha of the high mountain Andean ecosystems 
and to expanding protected areas by 2.5 million ha. There is no 
specific mention in the NDC of Indigenous Peoples or of securing 
indigenous land rights, although it does mention building peace and 
reducing conflicts, which have threatened indigenous lands. As with 
Bolivia, Colombia’s NDC also commits to expanding agriculture, 
which could threaten indigenous lands.
        71Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs
APPENDIX 2 : MATCHING  
ANALYSIS DETAILS
Overview
In this report, we conducted a primary matching analysis to 
examine the link between providing formal land title to Indigenous 
Peoples and 2000–2012 deforestation in the Amazon basin in 
three countries: Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. The analysis uses 
fine-scale data derived from satellite images to measure deforesta-
tion along with statistical techniques that aim to disentangle the 
effects of land-titling from those of pre-existing characteristics of 
the indigenous lands that affect deforestation, including population 
density and proximity to population centers. We find that, even after 
controlling for such factors, titling of indigenous land is correlated 
with substantially lower rates of deforestation in Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia. However, as discussed below, the data and analysis have 
limitations and therefore caution must be used in interpreting our 
results. Although our results suggest that titling indigenous land 
reduces deforestation, they do not amount to proof. 
This appendix details the methods and data used to derive the 
results summarized in Section 4.2.1 Matching Analysis for 
Estimating the Impacts of Tenure-Secure Indigenous Forestlands  
on Deforestation.
1. Sample
Our matching analysis uses a quasi-random sample of dimension-
less points defined by latitude and longitude coordinates. For each 
country included in our analysis—Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia—we 
select a sample by overlaying onto a map of the country a rectangu-
lar 1 km sampling grid, that is, a grid with points spaced 1 km apart 
vertically and horizontally. We include in the sample all points where 
gridlines cross. 
From the sample, we drop a number of subsamples. First, we drop 
all points outside of the Amazon basin of each country. For Brazil, 
the definition of the Amazon basin has a legal foundation (IBGE, 
2010). For Bolivia and Colombia, it is defined by a map of Amazon 
basin watersheds (Mayorga et al. 2012). Second, from the Bolivia 
and Colombia data sets, we drop all points inside protected areas. 
That ensures that all sample points in indigenous lands are matched 
to points outside that are not in protected areas. The purpose is 
to avoid conflating the effects of titling indigenous lands and of 
protected areas. For Brazil, as discussed below, we treat this issue 
differently. Finally, we drop from each sample a small number of 
points for which data from the various GIS layers are missing. 
2. Estimators
We use the following three matching estimators to generate 
treatment effect estimates.
 ▪ Nearest neighbor one-to-one propensity score 
matching. The first estimator uses propensity scores—the 
probability that a point is inside a titled community as predicted 
by a probit regression—as a measure of similarity between titled 
and untitled points. A propensity score can be interpreted as a 
weighted index of point characteristics, where the weights reflect 
the importance of each characteristic in explaining whether 
observations were included in the titled group (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983). Each titled point is matched to the one untitled 
point with the closest propensity score. Matching is with 
replacement and we enforce a common support. 
 ▪ Nearest neighbor one-to-eight propensity score 
matching. The second estimator uses propensity scores 
to match each titled point to the eight untitled points, with 
the average outcome for these eight points serving as the 
counterfactual.
 ▪ Probit with matched controls. The third estimator combines 
nearest neighbor one-to-eight covariate matching with regres-
sion, a hybrid approach that typically generates treatment effects 
estimates that are more accurate and more robust to misspecifi-
cation than does either matching or regression alone (Imbens 
and Wooldridge 2009; Ho et al. 2007). Specifically, we estimate 
a point-level probit regression in which the sample is limited to 
points inside titled communities and matched points outside, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether a 
point was cleared between 2001 and 2013, the key independent 
variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the point was in 
a titled community, and control variables are those listed in Table 
1. Because matching is with replacement, we weight untitled 
observations that constitute the control group based on the num-
ber of times they were included as matches (Abadie and Imbens 
2006). ATT (Average Treatment effect for the Treated) is given by 
the marginal effect of the treatment dummy variable. 
For each of these estimators, we require matched points outside 
indigenous land to be in the same biome as points inside. This 
“exact” matching helps ensure that the two sets of points are similar 
in terms of unobserved features that affect deforestation. 
For all three matching estimators we cluster standard errors at the 
level of the second-level administrative units (roughly the equivalent 
of counties in the United States). Clustering helps to control for 
spatial correlation of errors.
In addition to the three matching estimators discussed above, we 
also use a naïve estimator that does not control for selection bias—
the simple difference between the average rates of deforestation on 
all titled and untitled points in our sample. The purpose is to shed 
light on the value of our matching approach.
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3. Data
Table 2 lists the data used in our matching analysis, including the 
sources and units. Note that the population density variable is not 
used in the matching analysis in the cases of Bolivia and Colombia. 
The reason is that the probit regressions used to estimate propensity 
scores do not converge when it was included.  
4. Matching Quality
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we use mean standardized 
bias (MSB) to assess matching quality—the extent to which our 
estimators succeeded in identifying a set of matched untitled points 
with average characteristics that are similar to titled points. MSB 
is the mean across our control variables of the (variance-adjusted) 
percentage difference between the mean for the titled subsample and 
the matched untitled sample. A univariate summary statistic, MSB 
provides a concise means of assessing matching quality for multiple 
estimators. Although a clear threshold for acceptable MSB does not 
exist, a statistic below 3–5 percent is generally viewed as sufficient 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
5. Unobserved Heterogeneity
The key identifying assumption for matching estimators, typically 
referred to as “ignorability” or “conditional independence,” is that, 
conditional only on observed characteristics, non-random selection 
into the treatment is ignorable for purposes of measuring treatment 
effects (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Stuart 2010). In terms of 
our application, the assumption is that we are able to observe and 
control for all important confounding factors, that is, variables that 
affect both the probabilities that points were included in indigenous 
lands and that they were deforested between 2001 and 2012. This 
assumption is untestable. In practice, we recognize that it may not 
hold. For example, stumpage values, which we do not observe, may 
be negatively correlated with location in indigenous lands (if policy-
makers tend to shy away from titling communities in forests where 
logging earns particularly high profits) and positively correlated with 
deforestation (if loggers tend to target such forests). In principle, 
an inability to control for stumpage values could bias our treatment 
effects estimates upwards. 
We use Rosenbaum bounds to check for the sensitivity of our results 
to this type of unobserved heterogeneity (Aakvik 2001; Rosen-
baum 2002). Rosenbaum bounds indicate how strong unobserved 
confounding factors would need be to influence selection into the 
treatment in order to undermine a statistically significant ATT. To be 
more specific, the Rosenbaum procedure adapted to a binary out-
come generates a probability value for Mantel and Haenszel (1959) 
test statistic for a series of values of G, an index of the strength 
of the influence that unobserved confounding factors have on the 
selection process. G = 1 implies that unobserved confounding fac-
tors have no influence, such that pairs of plots matched on observ-
ables do not differ in their odds of being treated; G = 2 implies that 
matched pairs could differ in their odds of treatment by as much as 
a factor of two because of unobserved confounding factors; and so 
forth. The probability value on the Mantel and Haenszel statistic is 
a test of the null hypothesis of a zero ATT given unobserved con-
founding variables that have an effect given by G. So, for example, a 
probability value of 0.01 and a G of 1.2 indicate that ATT would still 
be significant at the 1 percent level even if matched pairs differed 
in their odds of protection by a factor of 1.2 because of unobserved 
confounding factors. We calculate G*, the critical value of G at which 
ATT is no longer significant at the 10 percent level in each case 
where ATT is significant. An ATT estimate can be considered highly 
sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity when G* is close to unity.
 
6. Results
Overall, our analysis suggests that: 
 ▪ The geophysical and socioeconomic characteristics of titled 
indigenous land are significantly different from those of land 
outside. As a result, it is, in fact, important to control for these 
differences in estimating the deforestation effect of the titling of 
these communities. 
 ▪ After controlling for observable differences between titled and 
untitled land, titling is correlated with reduced deforestation in 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia. 
BOLIVIA
In Bolivia, indigenous lands comprise 15 percent of the total land 
area of the country’s Amazon basin outside of protected areas. The 
2001–2012 rate of deforestation on land inside indigenous land was 
2 percent and that on unprotected land outside was 5 percent (Table 
A1). Indigenous land has different average characteristics than land 
outside: it tends to be at lower altitude, flatter, more carbon dense, 
farther from large population centers, less populated, and, in areas 
with relatively low opportunity costs, to have more rain, and higher 
temperatures. 
Table A1  |   Bolivia: Variable Means and 
Difference in Means Tests for Two 
Subsamples (Titled, Untitled)
VARIABLE MEAN TILLE=1 (N=90,782)
MEAN TILLE=0
(N=513,432) T-TEST
Outcome
CLEAR 0.018 0.053 ***
Treatment
TILLE 1.000 0.000 ***
Controls
ALTITUDE 495.524 683.875 ***
SLOPE 3.639 5.432 ***
NORTHFACE 0.387 0.383 ***
CARBON 174.988 116.612 ***
TRAVEL TIME 815.813 636.678 ***
POPULATION 3.401 10.238 ***
OPP. COST 6.247 14.934 ***
RAIN 123.953 118.700 ***
TEMP 242.511 234.947 ***
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After controlling for these differences, we find that indigenous 
lands are correlated with reductions in deforestation ranging from 
64–67 percent (Figure A1; Table A2). These estimated effects are 
somewhat smaller than the 74 percent reduction implied by a naïve 
comparison of deforestation rates inside and outside indigenous 
lands, that is, a comparison that does not control for pre-existing 
land characteristics. 
As noted above, we use matching to control for these observable 
differences. MSB before matching is 26.8 percent (Table A2). MSB 
after matching for the nearest neighbor 1-1 estimator is 4.2 percent 
and for the nearest neighbor 1-8 estimator is 4.3 percent. In both 
cases, these statistics meet the conventional acceptability standard. 
Table A2  |   Bolivia: Effect of Titling on 2001–2013 
Deforestation Inside Indigenous 
Lands: Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated in Percentage Points, by 
Estimator (standard errora) [mean 
standardized biasb] {critical value of 
Rosenbaum’s Gc} 
ESTIMATOR STATISTIC
Naïve 
Unmatched controls -73.8***
[26.8]
Propensity score matching
Nearest neighbor 1-1 -67.5***
[4.2]
{3.0}
Nearest neighbor 1-8 -67.3***
[4.3]
{3.0}
Probit w/matched controls -63.7***
[4.3]
Outcome treatment points 0.018
No. points 604,214
No. points treatment 90,782
*** p<1 percent, ** p<5 percent, * p<10 percent. 
a Standard errors for propensity score matching estimators clustered at the county 
(municipio) level.
b For a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the absolute value of the 
difference of means in the treated and matched untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. We 
report the mean SB for all covariates.
c Critical value of odds of differential assignment to indigenous land due 
to unobserved factors (i.e., value above which ATT is no longer statistically 
significant at 10 percent level).
ATT from all three of our estimators are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. They range from 64–68 percent (Table 
A2). Sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are robust 
to moderate levels of unobserved heterogeneity (Table A2). For 
both our 1-1 and 1-8 propensity score estimators, G* is 3.0. Note 
that a gamma value of 3 (or whatever other number) means that 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) would still be 
significantly different from zero even if the titled areas had a three 
times larger probability of being titled due to unobserved factors.
The naïve estimator generates a slightly larger ATT than our match-
ing estimators (74 percent). The implication is that in Bolivia, 
indigenous lands tend to be located in places with observable 
characteristics associated with relatively low rates of deforestation 
and that a failure to control for that fact biases ATT upwards.  
Figure A1  |   Effect of Bolivian Indigenous  
Lands on 2001–2012 Deforestation, 
by Estimator
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BRAZIL
In Brazil, indigenous lands comprise 28 percent of the total land 
area of the country’s legal Amazon basin outside of protected areas. 
Here, our analysis of the deforestation effect of indigenous land 
is more complicated than that for the other study countries. In our 
other study countries, we eliminate from our sample all points 
inside protected areas. The purpose is to avoid conflating the effects 
of indigenous lands and protected areas. We compare average out-
comes on (i) points inside indigenous lands, which are also outside 
protected areas, and (ii) points outside both indigenous lands and 
protected areas.
However, in Brazil, that strategy is not feasible. The reason is that 
today, 99 percent of indigenous lands have been legally designated 
as protected areas subject to the same land-use and land-cover 
change restrictions that apply to nonindigenous protected areas. 
Moreover, in some cases, protected area status was conferred 
upon indigenous lands after the start of the 2001–2012 period over 
which we measure deforestation. Given the complex dual status of 
indigenous lands as protected areas, the proper definition of our 
unmatched control group of points is unclear. Obviously, they must 
be outside indigenous lands. But an argument could be made for 
using points either inside or outside of protected areas. Therefore, 
we report results from both specifications. 
Unmatched control group comprised of points outside of both 
indigenous lands and protected areas
When we use as unmatched control points those that are outside 
of both indigenous lands and protected areas, the 2001–2012 rate 
of deforestation inside indigenous lands was 1 percent and outside 
was 9 percent (Table A3). In this sample, indigenous land has differ-
ent average characteristics than land outside: it tends to be at higher 
altitude, more steeply sloped, more carbon dense, farther from large 
population centers, less populated, and in areas with relatively low 
opportunity costs, to have more rain, and lower temperatures. 
Table A3  |   Brazil: Variable Means and Difference 
in Means Tests for Two Subsamples 
(Titled, Untitled)
VARIABLE MEAN TILLE=1 (N=1,105,080)
MEAN TILLE=0
(N=2,873,689) T-TEST
Outcome
CLEAR 0.007 0.086 ***
Treatment
TILLE 1.000 0.000 ***
Controls
ALTITUDE 233.021 209.3467 ***
SLOPE 3.560 2.822 ***
NORTHFACE 0.380 0.381 **
CARBON 226.749 146.229 ***
TRAVEL TIME 2255.391 1014.377 ***
POPULATION 1.050 4.828 ***
OPP. COST 13.824 32.319 ***
RAIN 187.916 167.152 ***
TEMP 255.186 257.550 ***
After controlling for these characteristics, we find that indigenous 
lands are correlated with reductions in deforestation ranging from 
53–91 percent (Figure A2; Table A4). Two of our three estimated 
effects are fairly close to the 92 percent effect implied by a naïve 
comparison of deforestation inside and outside indigenous lands.
Figure A2  |   Effect of Brazilian Indigenous  
Lands on 2001–2012 Deforestation, 
by Estimator
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
NAÏVE PSM 1-1 PSM 1-8 PROBIT
Pe
rc
en
t C
ha
ng
e
-92 -91 -91
-53
        75Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs
Table A4  |   Brazil: Effect of Titling on 2001–2012 
Deforestation Inside Indigenous 
Lands: Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated in Percentage Points, by 
Estimator (standard errora) [mean 
standardized biasb] {critical value of 
Rosenbaum’s Gc} 
ESTIMATOR STATISTIC
Naïve 
Unmatched controls
-92.3***
[41.2]
Propensity score matching
Nearest neighbor 1–1
-90.6***
[5.3]
{12.6}
Nearest neighbor 1–8
-90.6***
[5.4]
{14.4}
Probit w/matched controls
-53.3***
[5.4]
Outcome treatment points 0.007
No. points 3,978,769
No. points treatment 1,105,080
*** p<1 percent, ** p<5 percent, * p<10 percent. 
a Standard errors for propensity score matching estimators clustered at the county 
(municipio) level.
b For a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the absolute value of the 
difference of means in the treated and matched untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. We 
report the mean SB for all covariates.
c Critical value of odds of differential assignment to indigenous land due 
to unobserved factors (i.e., value above which ATT is no longer statistically 
significant at 10 percent level).
ATT from all three of our estimators are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. They range 54–91 percent (Table A4). Sensitivity 
analysis indicates that these results are quite robust to unobserved 
heterogeneity (Table A4). For our 1-1 propensity score estimator, G* 
is 12.6 and for our 1-8 propensity score estimator it is 14.4.
 
Unmatched control group comprised of points outside indigenous 
lands and inside protected areas
When we use as unmatched control points those that are outside 
of indigenous lands and inside of protected areas, the 2001–2012 
rate of deforestation inside indigenous lands was 1 percent and that 
outside was 2 percent (Table A5). Here too, land inside indigenous 
lands has different average characteristics than land outside: it tends 
to be at higher altitude, less steeply sloped, more carbon dense, 
farther from large population centers, less populated, and in areas 
with relatively low opportunity costs, to have more rain and lower 
temperatures.
Table A5  |   Brazil: Variable Means and Difference 
in Means Tests for Two Subsamples 
(Titled, Untitled)
VARIABLE MEAN TILLE=1 (N=1,105,080)
MEAN TILLE=0
(N=1,045,095)
T-TEST
Outcome
CLEAR 0.007 0.016 ***
Treatment
TILLE 1.000 0.000 ***
Controls
ALTITUDE 233.021 170.783 ***
SLOPE 3.560 3.721 ***
NORTHFACE 0.380 0.380
CARBON 226.749 223.110 ***
TRAVEL TIME 2255.391 1967.204 ***
POPULATION 1.050 3.278 ***
OPP. COST 13.824 17.522 ***
RAIN 187.916 187.246 ***
TEMP 255.186 260.179 ***
Our matching estimators do a good job of controlling for these 
characteristics. MSB before matching is 16.9 percent (Table A6). 
MSB after matching for both the nearest neighbor 1-1 estimator and 
the nearest neighbor 1-8 estimator is 4.1 percent. 
After controlling for these characteristics, we find that indigenous 
lands are correlated with reductions in deforestation ranging from 
57–65 percent (Figure A3; Table A6). These estimated effects are 
fairly close to the 57 percent effect implied by a naïve comparison of 
deforestation inside and outside indigenous lands.
Figure A3  |   Effect of Brazilian Indigenous  
Lands on 2001–2012 Deforestation, 
by Estimator
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Table A6  |   Brazil: Effect of Titling on 2001–2012 
Deforestation Inside Indigenous 
Lands: Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated in Percentage Points, by 
Estimator (standard errora) [mean 
standardized biasb] {critical value of 
Rosenbaum’s Gc} 
ESTIMATOR STATISTIC
Naïve 
Unmatched controls
-57.4***
[16.9]
Propensity score matching
Nearest neighbor 1-1
-64.6***
[4.1]
{2.7}
Nearest neighbor 1-8
-64.4***
[4.1]
{2.5}
Probit w/matched controls
-57.3***
[4.1]
Outcome treatment points 0.007
No. points 2,150,175
No. points treatment 1,105,080
*** p<1 percent, ** p<5 percent, * p<10 percent. 
a Standard errors for propensity score matching estimators clustered at the 
county (municipio) level.
b For a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the absolute value of the 
difference of means in the treated and matched untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. We 
report the mean SB for all covariates.
c Critical value of odds of differential assignment to indigenous land due 
to unobserved factors (i.e., value above which ATT is no longer statistically 
significant at 10 percent level).
ATT from all three of our estimators are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. They range from 57–65 percent (Table A6). 
Sensitivity analysis indicates that these results are moderately robust 
to unobserved heterogeneity (Table A6). For our 1-1 propensity 
score estimator, G* is 2.7 and for our 1-8 propensity score estimator 
it is 2.5. 
COLOMBIA
In Colombia, indigenous lands comprise 56 percent of the total 
land area of the country’s Amazon basin outside of protected areas. 
The 2001–2012 rate of deforestation on indigenous lands was less 
than 1 percent and that on unprotected land outside was 5 percent 
(Table A7). Again, indigenous land has different average character-
istics than land outside: it tends to be at lower altitude, flatter, more 
carbon dense, farther from large population centers, less populated, 
and in areas with relatively low opportunity costs, and higher 
temperatures. 
Table A7  |   Colombia: Variable Means and 
Difference in Means Tests for Two 
Subsamples (Titled, Untitled)
VARIABLE MEAN TILLE=1 (N=224,450)
MEAN TILLE=0
(N=174,669) T-TEST
Outcome
CLEAR 0.004 0.050 ***
Treatment
TILLE 1.000 0.000 ***
Controls
ALTITUDE 173.287 402.412 ***
SLOPE 2.268 4.445 ***
NORTHFACE 0.364 0.346 ***
CARBON 229.772 192.314 ***
TRAVEL TIME 3384.241 1525.130 ***
POPULATION 0.747 6.829 ***
OPP. COST 3.264 8.578 ***
RAIN 248.533 228.742 ***
TEMP 263.688 253.666 ***
After controlling for these characteristics, we find that indigenous 
lands are correlated with reductions in deforestation ranging from 
48–64 percent (Figure A4; Table A8). These estimated effects are 
somewhat smaller than the 91 percent reduction implied by a naïve 
comparison of deforestation inside and outside indigenous lands. 
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Figure A4  |   Effect of Colombian Indigenous 
Lands on 2001–2012 Deforestation, 
by Estimator
Our matching estimators do a reasonably good job of controlling for 
these characteristics. MSB before matching is 56 percent (Table A8). 
MSB after matching for both the nearest neighbor 1-1 estimator and 
the nearest neighbor 1-8 estimator is 4.4 percent. 
 
Table A8  |   Colombia: Effect of Titling on 2001–
2012 Deforestation Inside Indigenous 
Lands: Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated in Percentage Points, by 
Estimator (standard errora) [mean 
standardized biasb] {critical value of 
Rosenbaum’s Gc} 
ESTIMATOR STATISTIC
Naïve 
Unmatched controls
-91.3***
[56.0]
Propensity score matching
Nearest neighbor 1-1
-60.8**
[4.4]
{5.2}
Nearest neighbor 1-8
-63.8**
[4.4]
{8.8}
Probit w/matched controls
-48.2**
[4.4]
Outcome treatment points 0.004
No. points 399,119
No. points treatment 224,450
*** p<1 percent, ** p<5 percent, * p<10 percent. 
a Standard errors for propensity score matching estimators clustered at the county 
(municipio) level.
b For a given covariate, the standardized bias (SB) is the absolute value of the 
difference of means in the treated and matched untreated subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average sample variance in both groups. We 
report the mean SB for all covariates.
c Critical value of odds of differential assignment to indigenous land due 
to unobserved factors (i.e., value above which ATT is no longer statistically 
significant at 10 percent level).
ATT from all three of our estimators are statistically significant at the 
5 percent level. They range from 48–61 percent (Table A8). Sensitiv-
ity analysis indicates that these results are robust to unobserved 
heterogeneity (Table A8). For our 1-1 propensity score estimator, G* 
is 5.2 and for our 1-8 propensity score estimator it is 8.8. 
As in Bolivia, the naïve estimator generates a larger ATT than our 
matching estimators (91 percent). Here too, the implication is that 
indigenous lands tend to be located in places with observable char-
acteristics associated with relatively low rates of deforestation, and 
that a failure to control for that fact biases ATT upwards.  
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APPENDIX 3 : COST DATA DETAILS
BOLIVIA
Data presented for Bolivia were taken from World Bank—National 
Land Administration Project—Implementation Completion Report 
2006, International cooperation support for land regularization 
projects between 1995 and 2004, IDB project no. BO0221, and 
USAID financing support for land titling between 2003 and 2008. 
Data sources used for computing the per-hectare cost related to 
land-tenure security in Bolivia are presented in Table A9 and A10. 
However, since most of the land titling support from international 
organizations had been withdrawn from the country by 2012 (e.g., 
USAID had removed its country office by 2012), it was difficult to 
verify the detailed expenditures for the different land regularization 
and titling processes. 
Table A9  |   Sources of Cost Data Collected from International Organizations 
COSTS INCURRED BETWEEN 1996 AND 2002      
Variable Unit Value ($) Source
World Bank—National Land Administration Project—Implementation Completion Report 2006
INRA expenditures for land regularization component 2006$ 25,607,000 WB 2006
Property registry expenditures 2006$ 2,963,000 WB 2006
Agrarian tribunal expenditures 2006$ 308,000 WB 2006
Total 2006$ 28,878,000 WB 2006
International Cooperation Support for Land Regularization (Projects) ICL=Indigenous Community Lands
Regularization and titling of Monteverde, Guarayos, and Lupaguasu ICLs-pilot 2003$ 743,553 IDB 2003
Regularization and titling of ICLs in Oriente, Chaco, and Bolivian Amazon basin 2003$ 3,799,740 IDB 2003
Regularization and titling of Uru Chipayas and Uru Muratos ICLs 2003$ 110,682 IDB 2003
Regularization of the Ayllu Sicuya ICL 2003$ 70,243 IDB 2003
Regularization project in 17 Communities in Beni 2003$ 31,134 IDB 2003
Regularization of ICLs in highland and lowland areas 2003$ 3,805,662 IDB 2003
Program to support alternative development in Chapare 2003$ 6,577,200 IDB 2003
Project for regularization and titling in the TIPNIS, TICH, and CIRABO areas 2003$ 954,000 IDB 2003
Regularization and titling of ICLs in the TIPNIS and TICH areas 2003$ 545,000 IDB 2003
Rural legal cadastre project in Chuquisaca 2003$ 10,229,523 IDB 2003
Land titling project in the Tropic of Cochabamba 2003$ 3,500,000 IDB 2003
Total 2003$ 30,366,737 IDB 2003
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Table A10  |   Sources of Cost Data Collected from International Organizations (cont.)
TOTAL COSTS INCURRED BETWEEN 2003 AND 2012
Variable Unit Value ($) Source
Inter-American Development Bank —Land Regularization and Legal Cadastre Program (Project No. BO0221)
I. Management and supervision 2006$ 575,626 IDB 2012 (ES doc)
II. Direct costs 2006$ 17,402,997 IDB 2012 
Regularization and enhancement of agricultural property rights 2006$ 10,628,295 IDB 2012 
Consolidation and technical bases for maintenance of the legal cadastre 2006$ 6,774,702 IDB 2012 
III. Concurrent Costs 2006$ 282,341 IDB 2012 
Audits 2006$ 282,341 IDB 2012 
Total 2006$ 18,260,964 IDB 2012 
USAID Financing Support for Land Titling, 2003–2008 2008$ 8,968,846 USAID country profile
Table A11  |   Estimated Expenditure Data for Indigenous Lands in Bolivia (1999–2013, US$/ha) 
COST COMPONENTS ANNUAL VALUE $/HA NOTES YEARS
Cost of implementation of the INRA law through the land administration 
Project (WB land administration project)
1.68 one-off cost 1996–2002
Agrarian tribunal expenditures  (WB land administration project) 0.02 one-off cost 1996–2002
Property registry expenditures (WB land administration project) 0.19 one-off cost 1996–2002
International cooperation support for land regularization (projects) 
ICL=Indigenous Community Lands
1.14 one-off cost 1996–2002
USAID financing support for land titling 2003–2008 2.10 
one-off and  
recurring cost
2003–2008
Consolidation and technical bases for maintenance of the legal cadastre 0.08 recurring cost 2003–2008
Management and supervision costs for land regulation and cadastre 0.01 recurring cost 2003–2008
Regularization and enhancement of agricultural property rights 0.13 recurring cost 2003–2008
Other operating and monitoring costs 2.10 recurring cost 2003–2008
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BRAZIL
Table A12 provides an overview of national and local government 
expenses from 2005 to 2014. Local government expenses include 
support to Indigenous Peoples in order to guarantee their rights. 
This expense is included in a subgroup called “right of citizenship.” 
Expenses in this subgroup aim to guarantee the rights of minori-
ties and to assist them inside the municipalities. These expenses 
are assumed to be indicative of local support for all the initiatives 
regarding Indigenous Peoples’ rights.
Finally, the cost estimation also includes the cost of establishing a 
management plan. The calculation is based on a grant received by 
The Nature Conservancy (TNC) of $5.2 million for six indigenous 
lands. The total grant amount was divided by the area of six indig-
enous lands (1,248,948 hectares) in order to estimate a per-hectare 
value. The analysis assumes that only about 60 percent of the grant 
is applicable because the grant may also cover overhead and other 
general expenses for TNC. It is further assumed that management 
plans are established in year one, and are a one-time, upfront, 
expense. The management-plan cost is estimated at $2.61/ha/yr. 
Average annual cost estimates are assumed to remain constant 
for the 20-year analysis period. However, it is possible that this 
approach may over- or under-estimate costs because it appears 
likely that the budget for national programs will be reduced in 
coming years (Borger et al. 2015). Lower- and upper-bound values 
shown in Table A12 are used for the sensitivity analysis (lower 
bound assumes maximum costs; upper bound assumes minimum 
costs).
Table A12  |   National and Local Government Expenditure Data for Indigenous  
Lands in Brazil (2015 US$/ha) 
YEAR FUNAI EXPENDITURES ($) LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ($)
TOTAL 
($)
Ethnic Identity/ 
Cultural Heritage
Administrative  
Expenses
Protection/ 
Management Lands
Total 
2005                   0.11 0.20 0.26 0.57  0.03 0.60
2006                   0.10 0.17 0.21 0.48  0.03 0.50 
2007                   0.22 0.38 0.49 1.09 0.03 1.12 
2008                   0.24 0.42 0.54 1.19 0.02 1.21 
2009                   0.28 0.49 0.63 1.41 0.03 1.44 
2010                   0.33  0.57 0.73 1.63 0.12 1.74 
2011                   0.34 0.59 0.76 1.69 0.02 1.71 
2012                   0.33 0.58 0.75 1.66 0.01 1.67 
2013                   0.35 0.62 0.80 1.77 -- 1.77 
2014                   0.32 0.56 0.72 1.59 -- 1.59 
Source: CGU/Transparencia Pública 2015; FINBRA 2015.
        81Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs
COLOMBIA
The World Bank NRMP loan 3692-CO for US$39 million with a 
maturity of 17 years including a four-year grace period, draws to a 
close at the end of the year 2000. By June 2000, the program had 
achieved 72 percent of its land titling goals, benefitting 19,860 
families (over 100,000 people). The project spent US$3.25 million 
of the US$4.09 million allotted to these three components, leaving 
a balance of US$0.81 to terminate. The NRMP is responsible for 
17 percent of land collectively titled to Indigenous Peoples on the 
Pacific coast and 100 percent of land collectively titled to black 
communities in Colombia in general. In addition, our contact in 
INCODER confirmed that the average land titling cost per resguardo 
Indigena is about COL$70million, of which 50 percent is used for 
direct field costs. Based on these two sources of information, we 
then computed the land tenure security costs in Colombia.
APPENDIX 4:  BENEFIT-COST MODEL, 
ASSUMPTIONS
Benefit-Cost Analysis Model
The benefit-cost analysis for Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia compares 
a policy scenario to a no-policy scenario. As a result, the paper cal-
culates the net present value (NPV), that is, the difference between 
the benefit and cost streams for the analysis period of 20 years by:  
Where:
B
i
 = Benefits in year i
C
i
= Costs in year i
r= discount rate
Annual costs (Ci) were calculated in US$/ha/yr using the equation:
C
i
 = TE
i
 + CFE
i
 + M
i
Where:
TE
i
 = tenure-security establishment costs in year i 
CFE
i
= community-forestland establishment costs in year i 
M
i
 = management, operating, and monitoring costs in year i 
Benefits (Bi) were calculated in US$/ha/yr using the equation: 
B
i
= CM
i
 + OEB
i
 
Where:
CM = carbon-mitigation benefits in year i ($/ha/yr)
OEB = other ecosystem-service benefits in year i ($/ha/yr)
NPV  = ∑  Bi − Ci
(1 + r)i
i=1
20
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ENDNOTES
1. Some studies find little difference in the deforestation rates 
of indigenous forestlands and forests under other tenure 
types, and show that land titling (or forest management plans) 
alone have little effect on deforestation rates of indigenous 
forestlands (BenYishay et al. 2016; Buntaine et al. 2015; 
Rasolofoson et al. 2015). In many cases, the deforestation 
rates are uniformly low across all tenure types and on indig-
enous forestlands that are formally titled and not. This work 
underscores the many factors that can affect tenure security 
and forest outcomes (Baland and Platteau 1996; Pacheco and 
Benatti 2015; Ferretti-Gallon and Busch 2014; Larson and 
Lewis-Mendoza 2012).
2. This research does not examine indigenous lands outside the 
Amazon basin or non-indigenous community lands in the 
Amazon basin.
3. Despite the existence of increasing pressures on indigenous 
and community forestlands, it was not possible to examine the 
opportunity costs of these alternative land uses for this report.
4. According to the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI 2015), 
land that is designated for Indigenous Peoples and local com-
munities is land that is “governed under tenure regimes that 
recognize some rights on a conditional basis for Indigenous 
Peoples and local communities. While rights-holders have 
some level of ‘control’ exercised through use, management, 
and/or exclusion rights over land, they lack the full legal means 
to secure their claims to those lands (i.e., they do not have all 
rights required under the ‘ownership’ designation: the right to 
exclude, to due process and compensation, and to retain rights 
for an unlimited duration).”
5. UN Habitat estimates that 70 percent of lands in the developing 
world lack documented, recorded, or mapped land rights, but 
the percentage varies considerably by country and continent. 
For example, in 2013, the World Bank reported that, “90 per 
cent of Africa’s rural land is undocumented” (Byamugisha 
2013).
6. This figure recognizes 52 countries containing nearly 90 
percent of the global forest cover. It includes forestland legally 
recognized as community land, as well as state land to which 
communities have some formal, conditional rights.
7. Various methods exist for defining the boundaries of the Ama-
zon basin and there is no one definition of what constitutes the 
Amazon basin. The region is most commonly delimited using 
biophysical features (e.g., hydrography, relief, vegetation) or 
administrative boundaries. Legal, economic, and social criteria, 
however, can also be used to define the Amazon basin. For 
this research report, the Amazon basin is delimited using a 
hybrid of biophysical and administrative criteria. In Bolivia and 
Colombia, the boundary constitutes the hydrographic (i.e., wa-
tershed) limits of the Amazon, whereas in Brazil the boundary 
representing the “Legal Amazon” is defined by the state using 
administrative criteria. These boundaries of the Amazon basin 
are consistent with how RAISG defines the Amazon basin. 
In addition to Brazil, Ecuador also uses legal-administrative 
criteria for the boundary of the Amazon basin in its borders.
8. The government of Bolivia issues other titles to Indigenous 
Peoples and communities, which also provide tenure security, 
such as Asociaciones Sociales de Lugar (ASLs) (Cano et al. 
2015). 
9. FPIC is the right of communities to give or withhold their 
consent to proposed projects that may affect the lands they 
customarily own, occupy, or otherwise use.
10. With the exception of indigenous lands in Pando, Bolivia’s 
most northern province, located entirely in the Amazon basin. 
In Pando, individual exploitation of forests on indigenous 
(and non-indigenous) lands has been allowed since 2008 and 
the harvestable amount per individual has increased from an 
initial 3 cubic meters to 43 cubic meters. Since law SF IDF 
N004/2008 and all following adjustments, members of Indig-
enous Peoples and other communities can obtain legal permits 
to harvest timber individually (CITE).  
11. In Brazil, some collective forestlands are also held by Afro-
descendant (non-indigenous) communities and a number of 
collectively managed community forests are located in sustain-
able development reserves and extractive reserves.
12. As in Brazil, some collective forestlands in Colombia are also 
held by Afro-descendant communities.
13. Ecosystem services valued included food, water, raw materials, 
genetic resources, medicinal resources, improvement of air 
quality, climate regulation, regulation of water flows, waste 
treatment/water purification, erosion prevention, and recreation 
and tourism.
14. Ecosystem services valued include carbon benefits and 17 
other services, such as food, water, raw materials, and genetic 
resources.
15. Ecosystem services include carbon benefits and 15 other 
services including water regulation, pollination, and food 
production.
16. OECD (2013) defines collective action as “action taken by a 
group to achieve common interests.”
17. It can be argued that protection of tenure-secured forestlands 
may stimulate forest regeneration and hence contribute to 
higher economic benefits. However, quantifying the benefits of 
ecosystem regeneration would rely on a sophisticated biophys-
ical modeling process that is able to model the relationship 
between forest regeneration and the provision of ecosystem 
services by biomes under changing climate conditions in the 
future. This goes beyond the scope of the present research.
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18. In the statistical analysis of observational data, propensity 
score matching is a statistical matching technique that attempts 
to estimate the effect of a treatment, policy, or other interven-
tion by accounting for the covariates that predict receiving the 
treatment.
19. Probit regression, also called a probit model, is used to model 
dichotomous or binary outcome variables, such as success or 
failure in an exam.
20. Note that in Brazil, 99 percent of indigenous lands have been 
legally designated as protected areas subject to the same land-
use and land-cover change restrictions that apply to nonindige-
nous protected areas. Moreover, in some cases, protected-area 
status was conferred upon indigenous lands after the start of 
the 2001–2012 period over which we measured deforestation. 
Given the complex dual status of indigenous lands as protected 
areas, the proper definition of our unmatched control group of 
points is unclear. Obviously, they must be outside indigenous 
lands. But an argument could be made for using points either 
inside or outside of protected areas. Therefore, we report 
results from both specifications in Appendix 2. However, in 
this table and in this report, we used only the annual deforesta-
tion rate resulting from the unmatched control group—com-
prising points outside indigenous lands and inside protected 
areas—to estimate the total carbon benefits from deforestation 
reduction due to community forestland-tenure security. We do 
that because this specification is more conservative, that is, it 
generates a lower estimates of carbon benefits.
21. This difference in estimated deforestation rates has, in part, 
led to different estimates of avoided deforestation and carbon 
sequestration benefits in the present study, compared to those 
of Gray et al. (2015).  
22. The atomic weight of carbon is 12 atomic mass units, while the 
weight of carbon dioxide is 44, because it includes two oxygen 
atoms that each weigh 16. So, to switch from one to the other, 
use the formula: One tonne of carbon equals 44/12 = 11/3 = 
3.67 tonnes of carbon dioxide.
23. Social cost of carbon is different from other forms of carbon-
pricing mechanisms, such as the payments for forest commu-
nities to reduce emissions from REDD (Reduction of Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). Although the 
payment per tonne of CO
2
 emissions reduction through the 
REDD program reflects the actual benefits that Indigenous 
Peoples can receive, the determination of the “right” market 
prices is based on a cost-based approach, which accounts for 
site-specific factors (i.e., the opportunity costs of deforesta-
tion, which will be discussed in the cost section of this report) 
and the implementation and transaction costs associated with 
REDD (the REDD mechanism is more complex, involving the 
demand and supply side analysis), which go beyond the scope 
of the current report.
24. To better understand the ecosystem-service benefits pro-
vided by Indigenous forestlands located in different Amazon 
biomes, a significant amount of effort (time and resources) 
will be required to design original studies using market and/
or non-market valuation methods, as appropriate, to assess 
each benefit using site-specific and country-specific data. This 
analysis is outside the scope of the present study. 
25. The carbon-mitigation cost reported in the OECD/IEA report 
assumes new-build power plants with integrated CO
2
 capture 
installation that would be located in the United States, Europe, 
and China.
26. Based on U.S. Environmental Protection Agency GHG equiva-
lencies calculator: http://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-
gas-equivalencies-calculator
27. Further, in 2014, a new mining law (Law 535/14) was enacted 
in Bolivia, which declares all state lands open to mining 
(including protected areas), gives water and other natural re-
source rights to mining companies even on indigenous lands, 
and has no consultation or FPIC provisions (IWGIA 2015). The 
government also amended the legal process regarding FPIC—
the consultation process now lasts no more than 45 days 
(Cregan 2015). Such laws weaken the ability of Indigenous 
Peoples to bargain with government and companies, weaken 
their ability to protect their lands, and as a consequence, 
weaken land tenure.
28. In 2006, a pact between businesses, NGOs, and govern-
ment known as the Amazon Soy Moratorium (SoyM) was the 
first voluntary zero-deforestation agreement implemented 
in the tropics (SoyM was recently extended to May 2016). 
Since then, soya production on Amazon forestland has fallen 
dramatically (Butler 2015, Gibbs et al. 2015). Many producers 
are buying up converted pasture from cattle ranchers, however, 
which pushes ranchers to clear pristine habitats, including 
indigenous forestlands (Gibbs et al. 2015).
29. Maps and land-use plans are common requirements of the 
formal documentation process.
30. Estimates based on CAIT data (http://cait.wri.org/) indicating 
that the 2012 national GHG emissions of Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Colombia are 136.47MtCO
2
e, 1,823.15 MtCO
2
e and 199.68 
MtCO
2
e, respectively.
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